


Understanding Cryptography

by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

www.crypto-textbook.com

Chapter 8 – Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem

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These slides were prepared by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl
and modified by Sam Bowne

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8.1 Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange

Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange: Overview

- Proposed in 1976 by **Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman**
- **Widely used**, e.g. in Secure Shell (SSH), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)
- The Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) is a key exchange protocol and **not** used for encryption
(For the purpose of encryption based on the DHKE, ElGamal can be used.)

Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange: Set-up

1. Choose a large prime p
2. Choose an integer $\alpha \in \{2, 3, \dots, p-2\}$
3. Publish p and α

Essential idea:

Choose two random secrets a and b

$$(\alpha^a)^b \bmod p = (\alpha^b)^a \bmod p$$

Both parties can calculate that value without sending secrets over the wire

Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange

Alice

Choose random private key
 $k_{prA} = a \in \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$

Compute corresponding public key
 $k_{pubA} = A = \alpha^a \text{ mod } p$


Compute common secret
 $k_{AB} = B^a = (\alpha^b)^a \text{ mod } p$

Bob

Choose random private key
 $k_{prB} = b \in \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$

Compute corresponding public key
 $k_{pubB} = B = \alpha^b \text{ mod } p$

Compute common secret
 $k_{AB} = A^b = (\alpha^a)^b \text{ mod } p$




We can now use the joint key k_{AB}
for encryption, e.g., with AES

$$y = AES_{k_{AB}}(x)$$



$$x = AES^{-1}_{k_{AB}}(y)$$

Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange: Example



8.2 Some Algebra -- SKIP THIS SECTION

8.3 The Discrete Logarithm Problem

The Discrete Logarithm Problem

Definition 8.3.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in \mathbb{Z}_p^*
Given is the finite cyclic group \mathbb{Z}_p^ of order $p - 1$ and a primitive element $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and another element $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. The DLP is the problem of determining the integer $1 \leq x \leq p - 1$ such that:*

$$\alpha^x \equiv \beta \pmod{p}$$

A primitive element is a number α

that can generate all the values in the group

when raised to all the powers from 1 to $p-1$

For prime p , all elements are primitive except 1

Example: mod 7

3 is a ***primitive element*** or ***generator*** under the ***multiplication*** operation

$$3^1 = 3 \pmod{7}$$


$$3^2 = 9 = 2 \pmod{7}$$

$$3^3 = 27 = 6 \pmod{7}$$


$$3^4 = 81 = 4 \pmod{7}$$

$$3^5 = 243 = 5 \pmod{7}$$

$$3^6 = 729 = 1 \pmod{7}$$




Example: mod 7



```
[>>> for i in range(1,7):  
[...     print 3, "**", i, "= ", (3**i) % 7, "mod 7"  
[...  
3 ** 1 = 3 mod 7  
3 ** 2 = 2 mod 7  
3 ** 3 = 6 mod 7  
3 ** 4 = 4 mod 7  
3 ** 5 = 5 mod 7  
3 ** 6 = 1 mod 7
```

Example: mod 7

```
>>> for i in range(1,7):  
...     print 3, "**", i, "= ", (3**i) % 7, "mod 7"  
...  
3 ** 1 = 3 mod 7  
3 ** 2 = 2 mod 7  
3 ** 3 = 6 mod 7  
3 ** 4 = 4 mod 7  
3 ** 5 = 5 mod 7  
3 ** 6 = 1 mod 7
```



$$\alpha = 3$$

$$\text{DLP: } 3^x = 4 \pmod{7} \quad x = 4$$

$$\text{DLP: } 3^x = 1 \pmod{7} \quad x = 6$$

Kahoot!

Discrete Logarithm Problems Used in Cryptography

1. The **multiplicative group of the prime field Z_p** or a subgroup of it.

The classical **DHKE** uses this group, also **Elgamal** encryption and the Digital Signature Algorithm (**DSA**).

2. The cyclic group formed by an **elliptic curve**

3. The multiplicative group of a **Galois field $GF(2^m)$** or a subgroup of it. Schemes such as the DHKE can be realized with them.

4. **Hyperelliptic curves** or **algebraic varieties**, which can be viewed as generalization of elliptic curves.

Groups 1 and 2 are most often used in practice.

Attacks against the Discrete Logarithm Problem

- Generic algorithms: Work in any cyclic group
 - Brute-Force Search
 - Shanks' Baby-Step-Giant-Step Method
 - Pollard's Rho Method
 - Pohlig-Hellman Method
- Non-generic Algorithms: Work only in specific groups, in particular in Z_p
 - The Index Calculus Method

Generic algorithms

- Brute-Force Search
- Shanks' Baby-Step-Giant-Step Method
 - Time-memory trade-off
- Pollard's Rho Method
 - Probabilistic, as fast as Shank's but doesn't require much memory, based on the Birthday paradox
 - Best known algorithm for elliptic curves

Generic algorithms

- Pohlig-Hellman Method
 - Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem
 - Factor group order (size) into prime components
 - Attack each subgroup separately
 - To prevent this attack, the group order must have its largest prime factor in the range of 2^{160}

Chinese remainder theorem

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The **Chinese remainder theorem** is a theorem of [number theory](#), which states that if one knows the remainders of the [Euclidean division](#) of an [integer](#) n by several integers, then one can determine uniquely the remainder of the division of n by the product of these integers, under the condition that the [divisors](#) are [pairwise coprime](#).

The theorem was first discovered in the 3rd century AD by the Chinese mathematician Sunzi in *[Sunzi Suanjing](#)*.

The Chinese remainder theorem is widely used for computing with large integers, as it allows replacing a computation for which one knows a bound on the size of the result by several similar computations on small integers.

Nongeneric algorithm

- The **Index Calculus** Method
- Works only in specific groups, in particular in \mathbb{Z}_p
- Works on many discrete logarithm encryption schemes
- Does **not work** on **elliptic curve** systems

Attacks against the Discrete Logarithm Problem

Summary of records for computing discrete logarithms in \mathbb{Z}_p^*

Integers modulo p with Number Sieve (Index Calculus)		
Year	# digits	# bits
2005	130	431
2007	160	530
2014	180	596
2016	232	768

In order to prevent attacks that compute the DLP, it is recommended to use primes with a length of at least 1024 bits for schemes such as Diffie-Hellman in \mathbb{Z}_p^*

Attacks against the Discrete Logarithm Problem

Elliptic curves challenges with key sizes of 108 and 109 bits have been solved

But no solutions are known for 131-bit keys

8.4 Security of the Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange

Active Attacker: Man-in-the-Middle

MITM can defeat the system, lying to both parties
Attacker chooses his own **a** and **b** and completes the DHE with both parties

Alice

Choose random private key

$$k_{prA} = a \in \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$$

Compute corresponding public key

$$k_{pubA} = A = \alpha^a \text{ mod } p$$

Compute common secret

$$k_{AB} = B^a = (\alpha^b)^a \text{ mod } p$$

Bob

Choose random private key


$$k_{prB} = b \in \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$$

Compute corresponding public key

$$k_{pubB} = B = \alpha^b \text{ mod } p$$

Compute common secret

$$k_{AB} = A^b = (\alpha^a)^b \text{ mod } p$$



Passive Attacker (Listening Only)

- Which information does Oscar have?
 - α, p (they are public)
 - $k_{pubA} = \mathbf{A} = \alpha^a \bmod p$
 - $k_{pubB} = \mathbf{B} = \alpha^b \bmod p$
- Which information does Oscar want to have?
 - $k_{AB} = \alpha^{ba} = \alpha^{ab} \bmod p$
 - This is known as Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP)
- The only known way to solve the DHP is to solve the DLP, i.e.
 1. Compute $a = \log_{\alpha} A \bmod p$
 2. Compute $k_{AB} = B^a = \alpha^{ba} \bmod p$

It is conjectured that the DHP and the DLP are equivalent, i.e., solving the DHP implies solving the DLP.
- To prevent attacks, i.e., to prevent that the DLP can be solved, choose $p > 2^{1024}$

8.5 The Elgamal Encryption Scheme

The Elgamal Encryption Scheme: Overview

- Proposed by Taher Elgamal in 1985
- Can be viewed as an extension of the DHKE protocol
- Based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem and the Diffie–Hellman problem

The Elgamal Encryption Scheme: Principle

Alice

Bob

choose $d = k_{prB} \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$

compute $\beta = k_{pubB} = \alpha^d \bmod p$

β



choose $i = k_{prA} \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$

compute ephemeral key

$k_E = k_{pubA} = \alpha^i \bmod p$

k_E



compute $k_M = \beta^i \bmod p$

compute $k_M = k_E^d \bmod p$

encrypt message $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$:

$y = x \cdot k_M \bmod p$

y



decrypt $x = y \cdot k_M^{-1} \bmod p$

This looks very similar to the DHKE! The actual Elgamal protocol re-orders the computations which helps to save one communication (cf. next slide)

The Elgamal Encryption Protocol

Alice

Bob

choose large prime p

choose primitive element $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$
or in a subgroup of \mathbb{Z}_p^*

choose $d = k_{prB} \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$

compute $\beta = k_{pubB} = \alpha^d \bmod p$

$k_{pubB} = (p, \alpha, \beta)$

choose $i = k_{prA} \in \{2, \dots, p-2\}$

compute $k_E = k_{pubA} = \alpha^i \bmod p$

compute masking key $k_M = \beta^i \bmod p$

encrypt message $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$:

$y = x \cdot k_M \bmod p$

(k_E, y)

compute masking key $k_M = k_E^u \bmod p$

decrypt $x = y \cdot k_M^{-1} \bmod p$

Computational Aspects

- Key Generation
 - Generation of prime p
 - p has to be at least 1024 bits long
- Encryption
 - Requires two modular exponentiations and a modular multiplication
 - All operands have a bit length of $\log_2 p$
 - Efficient execution requires methods such as the square-and-multiply algorithm
- Decryption
 - Requires one modular exponentiation and one modular inversion
 - As shown in *Understanding Cryptography*, the inversion can be computed from the ephemeral key

Security

■ Passive attacks

- Attacker eavesdrops p , α , $\beta = \alpha^d$, $k_E = \alpha^i$, $y = x \cdot \beta^i$ and wants to recover x
- Problem relies on the DLP
- Key must be at least **1024 bits** long

■ Active attacks

- MITM attack defeats it
- An attack is also possible if the secret exponent i is being used more than once
- If attacker can guess the plaintext of one message, it can be used to decrypt another message using the same key

Lessons Learned

- The Diffie–Hellman protocol is a widely used method for key exchange. It is based on cyclic groups.
- The discrete logarithm problem is one of the most important one-way functions in modern asymmetric cryptography. Many public-key algorithms are based on it.
- For the Diffie–Hellman protocol in Z_p^* , *the prime p should be at least 1024 bits long*. This provides a security roughly equivalent to an 80-bit symmetric cipher.
- For a better long-term security, a prime of length 2048 bits should be chosen.
- The Elgamal scheme is an extension of the DHKE where the derived session key is used as a multiplicative mask to encrypt a message.
- Elgamal is a probabilistic encryption scheme, i.e., encrypting two identical messages does not yield two identical ciphertexts.

Kahoot!