Vulnerable Android Apps
App Vulnerability PicsArt (100 Million Downloads) SSL MITM; still vulnerable 5-23-15 ASTRO File Manager with Cloud (50 Million Downloads) SSL MITM ES File Explorer File Manager (100 Million Downloads) SSL MITM CityShop - for Craigslist (10 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Truecaller - Caller ID & Block (50 Million Downloads) Plaintext PII Transmission Instachat (5 Million Downloads) SSL MITM; still vulnerable 5-23-15 Phone for Google Voice & GTalk (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM OkCupid (5 Million Downloads) SSL MITM; fixed as of 5-23-15 Safeway (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM DISH Anywhere (5 Million Downloads) SSL MITM SomNote (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM, but hashing reduces the harm Supermovil Santander Mexico (500,000 Downloads) SSL MITM Minha Conta (Santander Brazil) (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM State Bank Anywhere (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Snap Secure (100,000 Downloads) SSL MITM FIXED 4-30-15 AMC Security (5 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Amway (100,000 Downloads) SSL MITM Ask (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Band (10 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Club Personal (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM DailyFinance from AOL (100,000 Downloads) SSL MITM DMV NOW (California DMV) (500,000 Downloads) SSL MITM Equifax (100,000 Downloads) SSL MITM Floating Browser (100,000 Downloads) SSL MITM; exposes all credentials entered into the browser Foxit MobilePDF - PDF reader (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM; exposes DropBox, Box, Microsoft, and Google credentials (fixed 5-18-15) GittiGidiyor (eBay) (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM IM+ (100,000 Downloads) SSL MITM; exposes Google credentials InstaG (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM InstaMessage (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM KickSend (500,000 Downloads) SSL MITM Kid Mode (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Lyoness (100,000 Downloads) SSL MITM Mini Online Shopping (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM; password hashed NBA (5 Million Downloads) SSL MITM InstaPost (1 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Pizza Hut (5 Million Downloads) SSL MITM Vulnerable Medical Android Apps
HIPAA Requirements
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In my opinion, all the apps below fail to comply with HIPAA
EyeXam (5000 Downloads) SSL MITM Garland & Associates (10 Downloads) SSL MITM GenieMD (10,000 Downloads)
UPDATED with Vendor ResponseSSL MITM Liver Health - Hepatitis C (500 Downloads) SSL MITM LowestMed Corporate Rx (1000 Downloads) SSL MITM Order Mvi (50 Downloads) SSL MITM Pain Timer (50 Downloads) SSL MITM Pharmacy Health Connect (1000 Downloads) SSL MITM Pulsara (100 Downloads) SSL MITM RCEMS Field Guide (1000 Downloads) SSL MITM RCP Sacramento (500 Downloads) SSL MITM Rx Refills (1000 Downloads) SSL MITM T-Res Fast Clinical Logging (1000 Downloads) SSL MITM UCLA eIBD (100 Downloads) SSL MITM UCLA Health (1000 Downloads) SSL MITM Virtual Physician's Network (1 Download) Plaintext HTTP authentication
Here are details of the CERT test and notification, from 9/3/2014: Finding Android SSL Vulnerabilities with CERT Tapioca. This spreadsheet from CERT, shows "Android App SSL Failures": Android apps that fail to validate SSL
So no HTTPS connections should be possible through the proxy.
CERT notified the author about the SSL vulnerability on 8-27-14, and the app was updated on 3-13-15, but it's still vulnerable.
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
CERT notified the author about the SSL vulnerability on 9-11-14, and the app was updated on 4-24-15, but it's still vulnerable.
Sending test credentials to connect a Microsoft OneDrive account:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
The app was updated on 4-16-15, but it's still vulnerable.
Sending test credentials to connect a SugarSync account:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
The app was updated on 3-20-15, but it's still vulnerable.
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
The app was updated on 4-21-15.
The app doesn't use SSL at all. Instead, it sends the user's private data (email, name, and phone number, which is redacted in the image below) in plaintext each time the user clicks "FAQ":
That is a strange thing to do, since the Privacy settings mislead the user into imagining that he or she has control over who can see profile data:
The app was updated on 2-27-15, but it's still vulnerable.
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
The app was updated on 2-10-15, but it's still vulnerable.
Sending test credentials:
It gives a connection error:
But it sends the credentials to the attacker anyway:
This is droll--it tries to place the blame on the user for its broken HTTPS implementation. I decided to use Wi-Fi anyway.
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
I logged in with test credentials, and harvested them from Burp via MITM attack. Note that the HTTPS certificate is not validated, so the username is visible, but since the app uses hashing the password is not visible.
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Note that the password is hashed or encrypted so that it cannot be trivially captured, even though AMC broke HTTPS. Three cheers for defense in depth!
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
It offers to connect to several cloud services:
And it leaks credentials for every one I tested: DropBox, Box, Microsoft, and Google.
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
On 5-23-15 I noticed that there's a new version:
And the problem is indeed fixed!
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
It offers to connect to several services:
Most aren't vulnerable to an MITM attack, but Google is. Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
The designers have chosen to leave the apps insecure months after CERT warned them of the insecurity.
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
I wasn't able to test the actual transmission of medical data, but it is presumably also exposed to a MITM attack.
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending a medical question:
Harvesting personal medical data via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
You put your personal medical data in here:
And an attacker in the middle gets it here:
Here are the rules. GenieMD may be correct, it's not clear to me.
Here's the app:
You are supposed to enter in personal medical data.
It hasn't been updated since last year:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
It has a questionnaire asking very sensitive questions:
It then sends the questions, but not the answers, up to the server insecurely, so the MITM attacker can see them.
It asks you to search for a clinic, entering your address:
It sends a latitude and longitude, which the MITM attacker can see:
However, the latitude and longitude is far away from the address I entered:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test PII:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending a prescription number:
Harvesting the data from Burp via MITM attack:
You'll be glad to know this app is "HIPAA compliant"!
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
Patients are expected to use this app for "messaging your healthcare team" and other actions using private healthcare information:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp via MITM attack:
This app is intended for patients to use to "access your health records":
Entering sensitive data into the app:
Harvesting it from Burp via MITM attack:
It explicitly claims to be HIPAA compliant:
Sending test credentials:
Harvesting them from Burp is to easy--this app uses HTTP with no encryption at all!