


CNIT 127: Exploit Development Vulnerability Discovery Ch 16: Fault Injection



Updated 4-4-17

Fault Injection

- Long used to verify the fault tolerance of hardware, such as
 - Automobile and airplane components
 - Coffee makers
- Faults are injected through
 - Pins of integrated circuits
 - Bursts of EMI (Electromagnetic Interference)
 - Altered voltage levels, etc.


QA (Quality Assurance)

- Engineers test software for weaknesses with fault injection
- Automating these tests makes their work much more efficient
- They also use manual auditing techniques
 - Reverse engineering
 - Source code auditing

Topics

- Design Overview
- Fault Monitoring
- Putting It Together

Design Overview



Input Generation

- Select input that uses esoteric and untested software features
- This request uses the uncommon .ida filetype
 - An ISAPI filter included in IIS web server

```
GET /search.ida?group=kuroto&q=riot HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0
Host: 192.168.1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQNNNTEG=ODDDDIOANNCXXXIIMGLLNG
```

Generating Input

- Manual generation
 - Build inputs in a text editor
 - Time-consuming, but produces best results
- Automated generation
 - Creating fake input with a program
 - May waste time on buggy input

Generating Input

- Live capture
 - Inject faults directly into live network traffic
 - Requires complex adjustment of data size fields, checksums, etc.
- Fuzz generation
 - Researchers noticed core dumps when using a dial-up modem during a thunderstorm
 - Random data injection found many new faults

Fault Injection

- Open-source apps
 - Can be recompiled with special added code to improve fuzzing
 - Such as American Fuzzy Lop (link Fuzz 15)
- Closed-source apps
 - Only input data is modified

Modification Engines

- To find buffer overflows
 - Inject variable-sized data to elements
 - Use non-alphanumeric characters to delimit elements
 - Inject into elements, without altering delimiters

```
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1  
Host: test.com
```

A sample run with ten iterations using the fault `EEYE2003` would produce the following faulted input streams.

Sequential fault injection:

```
EEYE2003GET /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GEEYE2003ET /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GEEYE2003T /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GETEEYE2003 /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET EEYE2003/index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /EEYE2003index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /iEEYE2003ndex.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /inEEYE2003dex.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /indEEYE2003ex.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /indeEEYE2003x.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
```

Fault injection using delimiter logic:

```
GETEEYE2003 /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET EEYE2003/index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET EEYE2003/index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /EEYE2003index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /indexEEYE2003.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.EEYE2003html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.htmlEEYE2003 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.html EEYE2003HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
```

Defeating Input Sanitization

- Repeat existing characters instead of injecting new ones

```
GETTTTTTTTT /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET ////////////index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET          /index.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /iiiiiiiiiiindex.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /indexxxxxxxxxxx.html HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.hhhhhhhhhhhtml HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.htmmmmmmmmmmm HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.html HHHHHHHHHHHTTP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.html HTTPPPPPPPPPPP/1.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
GET /index.html HTTP/11111111111.1\r\nHost: test.com\r\n\r\n
```

Fault Delivery

1. Create network connection to target application.
 2. Send our modified input data over the created connection.
 3. Wait momentarily for a response.
 4. Close the network connection.
- Nagel algorithm
 - Delays transmission of small datagrams so they can be grouped together
 - Enabled by default in Windows
 - Must be disabled with `NO_DELAY` flag
 - Link Ch 16a


Fault Monitoring

Using a Debugger

- Good for interactive fault testing
- Capture every exception, if possible
 - Instead of passing them to the application first ("First chance")
- Access-violation exceptions are the most important
 - Indicate that data structures used to read or write to RAM were corrupted

CNIT 127: Exploit Development

Ch 17: The Art of Fuzzing



Static Analysis

- Analyzing code that is not running
- Source code or binary
- Many bugs found this way are unimportant in practice
 - Because there is no input from the user that "reaches" the buggy code
 - There's no easy way to determine the reachability of a bug from static analysis

Fuzzing is Scalable

- An SMTP fuzzer can test any SMTP server
- No need to rewrite it
- Very simple strings may apply to many protocols
 - Such as "../" * 5000

Weaknesses in Fuzzers

- Some parts of code won't be hit by a fuzzer
 - Because it requires special input values we don't know about
- Fuzzing gets very slow if many parameters vary
- Fuzzing should be supplemented by static analysis and runtime binary analysis

SPIKE

- Builds a network packet by adding data one field at a time to a "spike" data structure
- Automatically fills in size fields, checksums, etc.
- Has various sending programs
 - Such as `generic_send_tcp`

SPIKE Functions

- `s_string("Hello, world!");`
 - Adds the literal string **Hello World!** to the spike
- `s_string_variable("MESSAGE");`
 - Adds a series of varying strings to the spike
 - The first one is **MESSAGE**
- `s_readline();`
 - Reads a message from the server

Very Simple SPIKE Script

- Enough to fuzz "Vulnerable Server"

```
GNU nano 2.2.6                               File: trun.spk
s_readline();
s_string("TRUN ");
s_string_variable("COMMAND");
```

X-Query (for Unix)

- Capture with WireShark

```
[-] Frame 3 (108 bytes on wire (84 bytes captured) on interface eth0)
[-] Ethernet II, Src: IntelE100 (08:00:00:08:00:08), Dst: IntelE100 (08:00:00:08:00:08)
[-] Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.101, Dst: 192.168.1.104
[-] User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 34130, Dst Port: 177
[-] X Display Manager Control Protocol
    Version: 1
    Opcode: Request (0x0007)
    Message length: 60
    Display number: 2
    [-] Connections (1)
        [-] Connection 1: 192.168.1.101
            Type: Internet
            Address: 192.168.1.101
            Authentication name:
            Authentication data (0 bytes)
    [-] Authorization names (2)
        Authorization name: MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1
        Authorization name: XC-QUERY-SECURITY-1
    Manufacturer display ID:
```

Spike Script (Partial)

```
//version
s_binary("00 01");
//Opcode (request=07)
//3 is onebyte
//5 is two byte big endian
s_int_variable(0x0007,5);
//message length
//s_binary("00 17 ");
s_binary_block_size_halfword_bigendian("message");
s_block_start("message");
//display number
s_int_variable(0x0001,5);
//connections
s_binary("01");
//internet type
s_int_variable(0x0000,5);
//address 192.168.1.100
//connection 1
s_binary("01");
//size in bytes
//s_binary("00 04");
s_binary_block_size_halfword_bigendian("ip");
//ip
s_block_start("ip");
s_binary("c0 a8 01 64");
s_block_end("ip");
//authentication name
//s_binary("00 00");
s_binary_block_size_halfword_bigendian("authname");
s_block_start("authname");
```


Project Walk-Through

Fuzzing with SPIKE

```
root@kali:~/spike# generic_send_tcp 172.16.1.129 9999 trun.spk 0 0
Total Number of Strings is 681
Fuzzing
Fuzzing Variable 0:0
line read=Welcome to Vulnerable Server! Enter HELP for help.
Fuzzing Variable 0:1
Variablesize= 5004
Fuzzing Variable 0:2
Variablesize= 5005
Fuzzing Variable 0:3
Variablesize= 21
Fuzzing Variable 0:4
Variablesize= 3
Fuzzing Variable 0:5
Variablesize= 2
Fuzzing Variable 0:6
Variablesize= 7
Fuzzing Variable 0:7
Variablesize= 48
^C
root@kali:~/spike#
```