
Understanding Cryptography – A Textbook for Students and Practitioners

by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl



These slides were prepared by Stefan Heyse and Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl And modified by Sam Bowne

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
- 11.1 Motivation: Signing Long Messages
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11.1 Motivation: Signing Long Messages

Motivation

Problem:

Naive signing of long messages generates a signature of same length.



- Three Problems
- Computational overhead
- Message overhead
- Security limitations
 - Attacker could re-order or re-use signed blocks

Solution:

Instead of signing the whole message, sign only a digest (=hash)


Also secure, but much faster

Needed:


5 Hash Functions

Solution

• Hash, then sign




Principal input-output behavior of hash functions




11.2 Security Requirements of Hash Functions


The three security properties of hash functions



preimage resistance



second preimage



collision resistance

Hash Functions: Security Properties

- **Preimage resistance:** For a given output z, it is impossible to find any input x such that h(x) = z, i.e., h(x) is one-way (Also called **one-wayness**)
- Second preimage resistance: Given x_1 , and thus $h(x_1)$, it is computationally infeasible to find any x_2 such that $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$ (Also called weak collision resistance)
- Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any pairs $x_1 \neq x_2$ such that $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$ (Also called strong collision resistance)

Hash Functions: Security

- Collison resistance causes most problems
- How hard is it to find a collision with a probability of 0.5?
- Related Problem: How many people are needed such that two of them have the same birthday with a probability of 0.5?
- No! Not 365/2=183
- 23 are enough! This is called the birthday paradox (Search takes ≈√2n steps)
- To deal with this paradox, hash functions need a output size of at least 160 bits


Hash Functions: Security

Table 11.1 Number of hash values needed for a collision for different hash function output lengths and for two different collision likelihoods

	Hash output length				
λ	128 bit	160 bit	256 bit	384 bit	512 bit
0.5	2^{65}	2^{81}	2^{129}	2^{193}	2^{257}
0.9	2^{67}	2^{82}	2^{130}	2^{194}	2^{258}

11.3 Overview of Hash Algorithms


Hash Functions: Algorithms



- MD4 family
- **SHA-1**: output 160 Bit; input 512 bit chunks of message *x;* operations bitwise AND, OR, XOR, complement and cyclic shifts.
- RIPE-MD 160: output 160 Bit; input 512 bit chunks of message x; operations like in SHA-1, but two in parallel and combinations of them after each round.


Hash Functions from Block Ciphers

- Matyas-Meyer-Oseas hash function
- Break original file into blocks
- Start with known public block H0, which may be all zeroes
- Encrypt a block using previous H as the key, then XOR with next block of file data to form the new H
- Repeat through whole file



$$H_i = e_{g(H_{i-1})}(x_i) \oplus x_i$$

Other Hash Functions from Block Ciphers



$$H_i = H_{i-1} \oplus e_{x_i}(H_{i-1})$$
 (Davies–Meyer)
 $H_i = H_{i-1} \oplus x_i \oplus e_{g(H_{i-1})}(x_i)$ (Miyaguchi–Preneel)

11.4 The Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-1

SHA-1

- Part of the MD-4 family.
- Based on a Merkle-Dåmgard construction
- Similar to a Feistel block cipher
- 160-bit output from a message of maximum length
 2⁶⁴ bit.
- Widely used (even tough some weaknesses are known)


How Big is 2**60 bits?

- 2**10 = 1024 = 1Kb
- 2**20 = 1Mb
- •2**30 = 1Gb
- $\bullet 2^{**}40 = 1 \text{ Tb}$
- 2**60 = 1 million Tb
- 2**63 = 1 million TB
- $2^{**}54 = 2$ million TB

SHA-1 High Level Diagram


$$x = x_1 x_2 \dots x_n$$

Compression
Function
consists of 80
rounds which
are divided
into four
stages of 20
rounds each



SHA-1: Padding

- Message x has to be padded to fit a size of a multiple of 512 bits
- Add k zero bits
- $\mathbf{k} = 512 64 1 1 = 448 (1 + 1) \mod 512$



SHA-1: Padding Example

Message is abc24 bits long

$$\mathbf{k} = 512 - 64 - 1 - 24 = 423$$

SHA-1: Hash Computation

Each message block x_i is processed in four stages with 20 rounds each

SHA-1 uses:


- A message schedule which computes a 32-bit word W0, W1, ..., W79 for each of the 80 rounds
- Five working registers of size of 32 bits A,B,C,D,E
- A hash value H_i consisting of five 32-bit words H_i⁽⁰⁾, H_i⁽¹⁾, H_i⁽²⁾, H_i⁽³⁾, H_i⁽⁴⁾
- In the beginning, the hash value holds the initial value H₀, which is replaced by a new hash value after the processing of each single message block.
- The final hash value H_n is equal to the output h(x) of SHA-1.

Initial value H_0 A 160-bit buffer is used to hold the initial hash value for the first iteration. The five 32-bit words are fixed and given in hexadecimal notation as:


$$A = H_0^{(0)} = 67452301$$

 $B = H_0^{(1)} = \text{EFCDAB89}$
 $C = H_0^{(2)} = 98\text{BADCFE}$
 $D = H_0^{(3)} = 10325476$
 $E = H_0^{(4)} = \text{C3D2E1F0}$.

SHA-1: All four stages



SHA-1: Internals of a Round



Stage t	Round j	Constant K _t	Function f _t
1	0019	5A827999	$(B \wedge C) \vee (B \wedge D)$
2	2039	6ED9EBA1	B⊕C⊕D
3	4059	8F1BBCDC	$(B \oplus C) \lor (B \oplus D) \lor (C \oplus D)$
4	6079	CA62C1D6	B⊕C⊕D

AND ↑
OR V
NOT -

 $XOR \bigoplus$

SHA-1 Collision Found

- Collision found on Feb. 23, 2017
 - Links Ch 12-2017-1, 2, and 3 in CNIT 123

```
[Sams-MacBook-Pro-3:proj14 sambowne$ ls -l sha*
-rw-r--r-@ 1 sambowne staff 422435 Feb 23 2017 shattered-1.pdf
-rw-r--r-@ 1 sambowne staff 422435 Feb 23 2017 shattered-2.pdf
[Sams-MacBook-Pro-3:proj14 sambowne$ shasum shattered-1.pdf
38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a shattered-1.pdf
[Sams-MacBook-Pro-3:proj14 sambowne$ shasum shattered-2.pdf
38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a shattered-2.pdf
[Sams-MacBook-Pro-3:proj14 sambowne$ md5 shattered-1.pdf
MD5 (shattered-1.pdf) = ee4aa52b139d925f8d8884402b0a750c
[Sams-MacBook-Pro-3:proj14 sambowne$ md5 shattered-2.pdf
MD5 (shattered-2.pdf) = 5bd9d8cabc46041579a311230539b8d1
```

Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

Announcing the first SHA1 collision

February 23, 2017

'First ever' SHA-1 hash collision calculated. All it took were five clever brains... and 6,610 years of processor time



Collision attack: same hashes



Good doc



Sha-1



3713..42



Bad doc



Sha-1



3713..42

Browsers Deprecated SHA-1

Microsoft, Google, and Mozilla will begin phasing out trust for SHA-1 certificates in 2016. With these dates approaching, it's time to move to SHA-2.

November 2014 –	SHA-1 SSL	Certificates expiring any time in 2017 will show a warning in Chrome.
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December 2014 - SHA-1 SSL Certificates expiring after June 1, 2016, will show a warning in Chrome.

January 2015 - SHA-1 SSL Certificates expiring any time in 2016 will show a warning in Chrome.

December 2015 – SHA-1 SSL Certificates issued after January 1, 2016, will show the "untrusted connection" error in Firefox.

January 2016 – SHA-1 SSL Certificates issued after January 1, 2016, will show a certificate error in Chrome.

Certificate criteria: signed with a SHA-1-base signature, issued after January 1, 2016, and chained to a public CA.

January 1, 2017 – Microsoft, Google, and Mozilla will end trust for all SHA-1 SSL Certificates.

Mozilla and Google say it is feasible to move this date up to July 1, 2016, in light of recent attacks on SHA-1.

Microsoft says it is feasible to move this date up to as early as June 2016, in light of recent attacks on SHA-1.

Link Ch 12zr in CNIT 123

Lessons Learned: Hash-Functions

- Hash functions are keyless. The two most important applications of hash functions are their use in digital signatures and in message authentication codes such as HMAC.
- The three security requirements for hash functions are one-wayness, second preimage resistance and collision resistance.
- Hash functions should have at least 160-bit output length in order to withstand collision attacks; 256 bit or more is desirable for long-term security.
- MD5, which was widely used, is insecure. Serious security weaknesses have been found in SHA-1, and the hash function should be phased out. The SHA-2 algorithms all appear to be secure.
- The ongoing SHA-3 competition will result in new standardized hash functions in a few years.

Kahoot,