


CNIT 141

Cryptography for Computer Networks



12. Elliptic Curves

Updated 11-30-22

Topics

- What is an Elliptic Curve?
- The ECDLP Problem
- Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement over Elliptic Curves
- Choosing a Curve
- How Things Can Go Wrong

New & Improved

- ECC was introduced in 1985
- More powerful and efficient than RSA and classical Diffie-Hellman
- ECC with a 256-bit key is stronger than RSA with a 4096-bit key

Slow Adoption

- OpenSSL added ECC in 2005
- OpenSSH added it in 2011
- Used in Bitcoin
- Most applications based on DLP can use ECC instead
 - Except Secure Remote Password
 - Link Ch 12a

What is an Elliptic Curve?

Elliptic Curve over Real Numbers

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$




Figure 12-1: An elliptic curve with the equation $y^2 = x^3 - 4x$, shown over the real numbers

Elliptic Curves over Integers

- Mod 191
- From group $\mathbf{Z}_{191} = 0, 1, 2, \dots, 190$




Figure 12-2: The elliptic curve with the equation $y^2 = x^3 - 4x$ over \mathbf{Z}_{191} , the set of integers modulo 191

The Field \mathbb{Z}_p

- We'll use both addition and multiplication
- We need 0 as the additive identity element
 - $x + 0 = x$
- There are inverses for addition ($-x$)
 - And for multiplication (denoted $1/x$)
- Such a group is called a ***field***
- A finite number of elements: ***finite field***

Adding Points

- $P + Q$: Draw line connecting P and Q
 - Find the point where it intersects with the elliptic curve
 - Reflect around X -axis




Figure 12-3: A general case of the geometric rule for adding points over an elliptic curve

$$P + (-P)$$

$$P = (x_P, y_P)$$

$$-P = (x_P, -y_P)$$

- Adding these points makes a vertical line
- Goes to the "point at infinity"
 - Which acts as zero for elliptic curves





Figure 12-4: The geometric rule for adding points on an elliptic curve with the operation $P + (-P) = O$ when the line between the points never intersects the curve

$$P + P$$

- Use tangent line



Multiplication

- $kP = P + P + P + \dots$ (k times)
- To calculate it faster, calculate:
 - $P_2 = P + P$
 - $P_4 = P_2 + P_2$
 - $P_8 = P_4 + P_4$
 - etc.

What is a Group?

- A set of elements (denoted x , y , z below)
- An operation (denoted \times below)
- With these properties
 - **Closure**
 - If x and y are in the group, $x \times y$ is too
 - **Associativity** $(x \times y) \times z = x \times (y \times z)$
 - **Identity** element e such that $e \times x = x$
 - **Inverse** For every x , there is a y with $x \times y = e$

Elliptic Curve Groups

- Points P , Q , R and "addition" form a group
 - **Closure**
 - If P and Q are in the group, $P + Q$ is too
 - **Associativity** $(P + Q) + R = P + (Q + R)$
 - **Identity** element O is the point at infinity
 - Such that $P + O = P$
 - **Inverse**
 - For every $P = (x, y)$, $-P = (x, -y)$
 - $P + (-P) = O$

The ECDLP Problem

ECDLP

- All elliptic curve cryptography is based in this problem

Given P and Q

Find k such that $Q = kP$

- Believed to be hard, like Discrete Logarithm Problem
- Has withstood cryptanalysis since its introduction in 1985

Smaller Numbers

- Using the field \mathbf{Z}_p
- Where p is n bits long
- The security is $n / 2$ bits
- A p 256 bits long provides 128 bits of security
- That would take more than 4096 bits with RSA
- ECC is much faster

Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement over Elliptic Curves

RSA-Based Diffie-Hellman (DH)

- They can both calculate g^{ab} by combining public and secret information

Keep a secret

Transmit g^a

Calculate $g^{ab} = B^a$



Keep b secret

Transmit g^b

Calculate $g^{ab} = A^b$



ECDH

- Choose a fixed point \mathbf{G} (not secret)
- Shared secret is $\mathbf{d}_A\mathbf{P}_B = \mathbf{d}_B\mathbf{P}_A = \mathbf{d}_A\mathbf{d}_B\mathbf{G}$

Pick a random secret \mathbf{d}_A

Transmit $\mathbf{P}_A = \mathbf{d}_A\mathbf{G}$

Calculate $\mathbf{d}_A\mathbf{d}_B\mathbf{G} = \mathbf{d}_A\mathbf{P}_B$

Pick a random secret \mathbf{d}_B

Transmit $\mathbf{P}_B = \mathbf{d}_B\mathbf{G}$

Calculate $\mathbf{d}_A\mathbf{d}_B\mathbf{G} = \mathbf{d}_B\mathbf{P}_A$



Signing with Elliptic Curves

- ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
 - Replaces RSA and classical DSA
 - The only signature used in Bitcoin
 - Supported by many TLS and SSH implementations
- Consists of ***signature generation*** and ***verification*** algorithms

Signing with Elliptic Curves

- Signer holds a private key d
- Verifiers hold the public key $P = dG$
- Both know:
 - What elliptic curve to use
 - Its order n (the number of points in the curve)
 - Coordinates of a base point G

ECDSA Signature Generation

- Signer hashes the message to form h
 - With a function such as SHA-256 or BLAKE2
- Signer picks a random number k
 - Calculates kG , with coordinates (x, y)
- Signature is (r, s) :
$$r = x \bmod n \quad s = (h + rd) / k \bmod n$$

Signature Length

- If coordinates are 256-bit numbers
 - r and s are both 256 bits long
 - Signature is 512 bits long

ECDSA vs. RSA

Signatures

- RSA is used only for encryption and signatures
- ECC is a family of algorithms
 - Encryption and signatures
 - Key agreement
 - Advanced functions such as identity-based encryption

ECDSA vs. RSA

Signatures

- RSA's signature and verification algorithms are simpler than ECDSA
 - RSA's verification process is often faster because of the small public key e
- ECC has two major advantages
 - Shorter signatures
 - Faster signing speed

Speed Comparison

- ECDSA is 150x faster at signing than RSA
- Slightly faster at verifying

```
$ openssl speed ecdsap256 rsa4096
              sign      verify      sign/s      verify/s
rsa 4096 bits 0.007267s 0.000116s   137.6      8648.0
              sign      verify      sign/s      verify/s
256 bit ecdsa (nistp256) 0.0000s 0.0001s 21074.6    9675.7
```

Encrypting with Elliptic Curves

- Rarely used
 - Message size can't exceed about 100 bits
- RSA can use 4000 bits at same security level

Integrated Encryption Scheme (IES)

- Generate a Diffie-Hellman shared secret
 - Derive a symmetric key from the shared secret
- Use symmetric encryption

Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)

- 1. Pick a random number, d , and compute the point $Q = dG$, where the base point G is a fixed parameter. Here, (d, Q) acts as an ephemeral key pair, used only for encrypting M .**
- 2. Compute an ECDH shared secret by computing $S = dP$.**
- 3. Use a key derivation scheme (KDF) to derive a symmetric key, K , from S .**
- 4. Encrypt M using K and a symmetric authenticated cipher, obtaining a ciphertext, C , and an authentication tag, T .**

Choosing a Curve

Parameters

- **Order** (number of points), also called **modulus**
- ***a*** and ***b*** in

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

- Origin of the chosen ***a*** and ***b***

Criteria for Security

- **Order** (number of points) must not be product of small numbers
- Curves that treat $P+Q$ and $P+P$ the same way are safer, to avoid information leaks
 - **Unified addition law**
- Creators of curve should explain how a and b were chosen, or people will be suspicious

NIST Curves

- Standardized in 2000
- Five *prime curves* (modulus is prime)
 - The most commonly used ones
- Ten others use "binary polynomials"
 - Make hardware implementation more efficient
 - Rarely used with elliptic curves

P-256

- The most common NIST curve
- Modulus is p
- b is a 256-bit number

$$p = 2^{256} - 2^{224} + 2^{192} + 2^{96} - 1$$

$$y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b$$

Where Did *b* Come From?

- NSA never explained it well
- Most experts don't believe there's a backdoor
- *b* is the SHA-1 hash of this random-looking value

c49d3608 86e70493 6a6678e1 139d26b7 819f7e90

But few people trust the NIST curves because of Snowden. Bruce Schneier wrote:

I no longer trust the constants. I believe the NSA has manipulated them through their relationships with industry.

and that:

I looked at the random seed values for the P-xxxr curves. For example, P-256r's seed is c49d360886e704936a6678e1139d26b7819f7e90. No justification is given for that value.

and:

I now personally consider this to be smoking evidence that the parameters are cooked.

And so, Bitcoin, Tor and so many applications avoid the NIST derived curves, and instead focus on **secp256k1** and **Curve 25519**. Bitcoin uses secp256k1 which has a prime of $2^{256}-2^{32}-977$, and Tor uses Curve 25519 which has prime of $2^{255}-19$.

- <https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/ding-ding-its-secp256k1-and-curve-25519-in-red-corner-and-nist-in-the-blue-corner-f49c4ad1c3a8>

Curve 25519

- Published by Daniel J. Bernstein in 2006
- Faster than NIST standard curves
- Uses shorter keys
- No suspicious constants
- Uses same formula for $P+Q$ and $P+P$

Curve 25519

$$y^2 = x^3 + 486662x^2 + x$$

$$p = 2^{255} - 19$$

- Used everywhere
 - Chrome, Apple, OpenSSH
- But not a NIST standard

Curve secp256k1

$$y^2 = x^3 + 7$$

$$p = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977$$

- Used in Bitcoin

<https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Secp256k1>

Other Curves

- Old national standards
 - France: ANSSI curves
 - Germany: Brainpool curves
 - Use constants of unknown origin

Other Curves

- Newer curves, rarely used
 - **Curve41417**
 - More secure variant of Curve25519
 - **Ed448-Goldilocks**
 - 448-bit curve from 2014

How Things Can Go Wrong

Large Attack Surface

- Elliptic curves have
 - More parameters than classic Diffie-Hellman
 - More opportunities for mistakes
 - Possible vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks
 - Timing of calculations on large numbers

ECDSA with Bad Randomness

- Signing uses a secret random k
$$s = (h + rd) / k \bmod n$$
- If k is re-used, attacker can calculate k
$$k = (h_1 - h_2) / (s_1 - s_2)$$
- This happened on the PlayStation 3 in 2010
 - Presented at CCC by fail0verflow team

Invalid Curve Attack

- Attacker sends P_A that is not on the same curve
 - From a weak curve instead
- Target fails to verify that P_A is on the curve, and uses a secret $d_B P_A$ on a weak curve, so ECDLP can be solved

Doesn't know d_A
Transmit malicious P
Calculates secret d_B



Pick a random secret d_B
Transmit $P_B = d_B G$
Calculate $d_B P$



Invalid Curve Attack

- Malicious client could trick server into using the wrong curve
- Exposing the server's secret key
- Some TLS implementations were shown to be vulnerable in 2015
 - <https://threatpost.com/json-libraries-patched-against-invalid-curve-crypto-attack/124336/>

JSON Libraries Patched Against Invalid Curve Crypto Attack

Kahoot!