#### CNIT 128 Hacking Mobile Devices



1. Mobile Application (In)security

#### Mobile OS Market Share



Link Ch 1a

#### Attack Surface

- Network communications
  - Often public Wi-Fi
- Device theft
  - Locally stored data
- Malicious apps on the phone
  - Often from Google Play
- Other input sources
  - NFC, Bluetooth, camera, microphonw, SMS, USB, QR codes



Figure 1.1 The incidence of some common mobile application vulnerabilities recently tested by the authors

## Key Problem Factors

- Underdeveloped security awareness
  - By developers
- Ever-changing attack surface
- Custom development
  - In-house code mixed with libraries from many sources

OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks

M1 – Weak Server Side Controls	M2 – Insecure Data Storage	M3 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection	M4 - Unintended Data Leakage
M5 - Poor Authorization and Authentication	M6 - Broken Cryptography	M7 - Client Side Injection	M8 - Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs
	M9 - Improper Session Handling	M10 - Lack of Binary Protections	

- M1: Weak Server-Side Controls
  - The most critical issue
  - Not a flaw on the phone
  - Server errors and misconfigurations
  - A whole class covers this: CNIT 129S: Securing Web Applications



- M2: Insecure Data Storage
  - Plaintext or obfuscated
- M3: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
  - Failure to validate TLS certificates
- M4: Unintended Data Leakage
  - In logs, cache, snapshots, etc

- M5: Poor Authorization and Authentication
  - Causes failures in access control
- M6: Broken Cryptography
  - Hard-coded key, or key stored on device
- M7: Client-Side Injection
  - App takes input from another app, server, etc.

- M8: Security Decision Via Untrusted Inputs
  - Often Inter-Process Communication (IPC)
- M9: Improper Session Handling
  - Exposing session tokens to adversary
- M10: Lack of Binary Protections
  - Allows reverse-engineering and modification of app

#### OWASP Mobile Security Tools

- iMAS
  - Framework to develop secure iOS apps
- GoatDroid, iGoat, DV iOS
  - Deliberately insecure apps for practice
- MobiSec
  - Mobile pentesting distribution, like Kali
- Androick
  - For Android forensics



· Link Ch 1b



Stock Trading				
<i>charles</i> SCHWAB	Charles Schwab (100,000)	Notified 2-22-15 via Twitter and CEO Promised to fix it Still vulnerable 5-22-15 Still vulnerable 7-12-15 Details & PoC		
OptionsXPRESS. "charles schwaß	OptionsXpress (50,000)	Notified 2-22-15 Semi-automated reply Still vulnerable on 5-23-15 Still vulnerable 6-13-15 Details & PoC		
<b>Scottrade</b> <sup>®</sup>	Scottrade (100,000)	Notified 3-2-15 Automated reply only Still vulnerable 5-22-15 Details & PoC		
CapitalOne	ShareBuilder Mobile by CapitalOne (100,000)	Notified 2-22-15 No reply Last updated 1-15-15 Still vulnerable 5-22-15 Details & PoC		
D Ameritrade	TD Ameritrade (100,000)	Notified 2-21-15 No reply Still vulnerable on 5-22-15 Much WORSE in 5-21-15 update Details & PoC		
TradeKing <sup>-</sup>	TradeKing (50.000)	Notified 2-22-15 No reply Fixed on 5-22-15! Details & PoC		

Insurance					
<b>Allstate</b> . You're in good hands.	Allstate (500,000)	Notified 3-6-15 Two automated replies Still vulnerable on 5-22-15 Details & PoC			
GEICO Mobile	GEICO (1 Million)	Notified 3-6-15 Has a vulnerability report page Promised to fix it but didn't Still vulnerable on 5-12-15 Still vulnerable on 7-12-15 Details & PoC			
Nationwide*	Nationwide (100,000)	Notified 3-8-15 Automated replies, content ignored Still vulnerable on 5-22-15 Details & PoC			
Progressive Insurance	Progressive (1 Million)	Notified 3-8-15 "Forwarded to developers" Still vulnerable on 5-22-15 Details & PoC			
My TRSRetire Transamerica	Transamerica <u>(10,000)</u>	Notified 4-10-15 No reply Last update 11-18-13 Still vulnerable 5-22-15 Still vulnerable 6-13-15 Details & PoC			

#### Android App Vulnerabilities Disclosed at DEF CON 25

#### Password Stored with Reversible Encryption



