

## Hands-On Ethical Hacking and Network Defense

#### Chapter 3 Network and Computer Attacks

Last modified 2-3-18

## Objectives

Describe the different types of malicious software Describe methods of protecting against malware attacks Describe the types of network attacks Identify physical security attacks and vulnerabilities

## Malicious Software (Malware)

Network attacks prevent a business from operating

#### Malicious software (Malware) includes

- Virus
- Worms
- Trojan horses
- Goals
- Destroy data
- Corrupt data
- Shutdown a network or system

## Viruses

Virus attaches itself to an executable file
Can replicate itself through an executable program
Needs a host program to replicate
No foolproof method of preventing them

## Antivirus Software

Detects and removes viruses
Detection based on virus signatures
Must update signature database periodically
Use automatic update feature

ected tems	Infection	Туре	Status	Info
(:\Users\Sam\Desktop\eicar.c	the EICAR test string	File	Quarantined	<u>Info</u>

## Common Viruses

Virus	Description
Gumblar	First detected in March 2009, it spread by mass hacking of hundreds of thousands of Web sites, which then exploited visiting browsers via Adobe PDF and Flash vulnerabilities. The malware steals FTP credentials that are used to further compromise Web sites the victim maintains. It also hijacks Google searches and blocks access to antivirus update sites to prevent removal. Recent variations install a backdoor that attempts to connect to a botnet.
Luckysploit	It's actually the attack side of a sophisticated cybercrime toolkit that spreads when Web surfers visit a hacked Web site hosting the malware. It uses obfuscated JavaScript code and asymmetric key encryption to prevent detection. The JavaScript code also targets victims based on recent vulnerabilities in OSs, applications, browser plug-ins, and so on.
Zlob	Purported to be the work of the Russian Business Network, Zlob has dozens of variants, some of which spread by masquerading as a codec needed to view an enticing video. Several variants are associated with "scareware," fake antivirus downloads that change home router settings to redirect victims to more malicious sites.
Gpcode	This "ransomware" virus detected in 2008 isn't widespread but is unique because it uses practically unbreakable 1024-bit asymmetric key encryption to hide a user's documents on the computer and hold them for ransom until the victim pays to get the encryption key.

## Base 64 Encoding

Used to evade anti-spam tools, and to obscure passwords Encodes six bits at a time (0 – 63) with a single ASCII character • A - Z: 0 − 25 • a – z: 26 – 51 1 − 9: 52 − 61 + and - 62 and 63 See links Ch 3a, 3b

## Base64 Example

Input String	0	R	A	С	L	E	-	
Binary Representation	01001111 <sub>2</sub>	01010010 <sub>2</sub>	01000001 <sub>2</sub>	01000011 <sub>2</sub>	01001100 <sub>2</sub>	01000101 <sub>2</sub>	-	
After regrouping into 6-bit groups. [Binary and decimal equivalents are shown.]	0100112 [1910]	1101012 [5310]	001001 2 [910]	0000012 [110]	010000 <sub>2</sub> [16 <sub>10</sub> ]	110100 <sub>2</sub> [52 <sub>10</sub> ]	1100012 [4910]	000101\2 [510]
After mapping the above eight 8-bit bytes using Table 1	т	1	J	в	Q	0	x	F

Base64 encoded string : T1JBQ0xF

## ORACLE -> T1JBQ0xF Link Ch 3r

## Viruses (continued)

Commercial base 64 decoders Shell

Executable piece of programming code
Should not appear in an e-mail attachment

## Macro Viruses

Virus encoded as a macro Macro Lists of commands Can be used in destructive ways Example: Melissa Appeared in 1999 It is very simple – see link Ch 3c for source code

## Writing Viruses

Even nonprogrammers can create macro viruses Instructions posted on Web sites Virus creation kits available for download (see link Ch 3d) Security professionals can learn from thinking like attackers But don't create and release a virus! People get long prison terms for that.

## Angler Exploit Kit



#### Link Ch 3z

C 🟠 🕯 Secure https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/02/threat-or-menace-autosploit-tool-sparks-fears-of-empowered-script-kiddies/ 🔍



SUBSCRIPTIONS

SCRIPT ERROR -

## Threat or menace? "Autosploit" tool sparks fears of empowered "script kiddies"

400 lines of Python code + Shodan + Metasploit equals a whole heap of hand-wringing.

SEAN GALLAGHER - 2/1/2018, 4:45 AM

#### Link Ch 3za, 3zb

## Worms

Worm Replicates and propagates without a host, often through email Infamous examples Code Red Nimda Can infect every computer in the world in a short time At least in theory

## Spread of Code Red Worm



#### See link Ch 3u

## ATM Machine Worms

Cyberattacks against ATM machines

Slammer and Nachi worms

- Trend produces antivirus for ATM machines
   See links Ch 3g, 3h, 3i
- Nachi was written to clean up damage caused by the Blaster worm, but it got out of control
   See link Ch 3j

 Diebold was criticized for using Windows for ATM machines, which they also use on voting machines

## Important Worms

Worm	Description
Storm	Detected in January 2007, it's spread by automatically generated e-mail messages. It's estimated that this botnet Trojan program and its variants infected millions of systems.
Mytob	Detected in 2005, it's a hybrid worm with backdoor capabilities spread by mass e-mailing and exploiting Windows vulnerabilities.
Waledac	This e-mail worm harvests and forwards passwords and spreads itself in an e-mail with an attachment called eCard.exe. It has many variants that can be controlled remotely. A recent variant uses a geographic IP address lookup to customize the e-mail message so that it looks like a Reuters news story about a dirty bomb that exploded in a city near the victim.
Conficker	Detected in late 2008, this botnet worm and its variants propagated through the Internet by using a Microsoft network service vulnerability. It updates itself dynamically but can be detected remotely with a standard port scanner, such as Nmap, and a special Conficker signature plug-in.
Mod_ssl	Detected in 2002, this worm affects Linux systems running Apache OpenSSL. It scans for vulnerable systems on TCP port 80 and attempts to deliver the exploit code through TCP port 443. A system infected with this worm begins spreading it to other systems on a network. See VU#102795 and CA-2002-23 at www.kb.cert.org/vuls for more information; this site cross-references vulnerabilities listed at www.cve.mitre.org.
Slammer	Detected in 2003, this worm was purported to have shut down more than 13,000 ATMs of one of the largest banks in America by infecting database servers located on the same network.

## **Trojan Programs**

Insidious attack against networks
 Disguise themselves as useful programs
 Hide malicious content in program
 Backdoors
 Rootkits
 Allow attackers remote access

## Firewalls

Identify traffic on uncommon ports Can block this type of attack, if your firewall filters outgoing traffic Windows Firewall in XP SP2, Vista, and Win 7 does not filter outgoing traffic by default Trojan programs can use known ports to get through firewalls • HTTP (TCP 80) or DNS (UDP 53)

#### Table 3-3 Trojan programs and ports

Trojan Program	TCP Ports Used
W32.Korgo.A	13, 2041, and 3067
Backdoor.Rtkit.B	445
Backdoor.Systsec, Backdoor.Zincite.A	1034
W32.Beagle.Y@mm	1234
Trojan.Tilser	6187
Backdoor.Hacarmy.C, Backdoor.Kaitex,	6667
Backdoor.Clt, Backdoor.IRC.Flood.E,	
Backdoor.Spigot.C, Backdoor.IrcContact,	
Backdoor.DarkFtp, Backdoor.Slackbot.B	
Backdoor.Danton	6969
Backdoor.Nemog.C	4661, 4242, 8080, 4646, 6565, and 3306

### Windows DLL Hijacking Vulnerability

DLL files are loaded from the incorrect directory Affects over 200 applications on every version of Windows No good patch yet (8-31-2010)Link Ch 3s, 3t, 3w

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	Local 1	Pa	ttp://1	72.16.30	16:80/					
	Server 1	tart	ed.							
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	172.16.1	10.22	9:49259	GET => 0	MTA (/	favicen.i	co)			
	172.16.1	10.22	9:49262	OPTIONS	/docum	ents				
	172.16.1	10.22	9:49262	PROPFING	/docur	ments				
	172.16.1	10.22	9:49262	PROPFIN	=> 30	1 (/docum	ents)			
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Sends information from the infected computer to the attacker

- Confidential financial data
- Passwords
- PINs
- Any other stored data

Can register each keystroke entered (keylogger)
 Prevalent technology
 Educate users about spyware

## **Deceptive Dialog Box**

#### Spyware Alert



Warning - your computer may have spyware or adware installed. To scan your computer for such

infections, click yes below.



#### Figure 3-2 A spyware initiation program

## Adware

Similar to spyware Can be installed without the user being aware Sometimes displays a banner Main goal Determine user's online purchasing habits Tailored advertisement Main problem Slows down computers

## Protecting Against Malware Attacks

Difficult task

 New viruses, worms, Trojan programs appear daily
 Antivirus programs offer a lot of protection
 Educate your users about these types of attacks

## **Virus Alert**

Microsoft Security Essentials	Alert			×
Potential threat det	ails			
Microsoft Security Essentials detected p computer. Your access to these items m more. <u>What do the alert levels mean?</u>	otential threats that ay be suspended un	might compromise your p til you take an action. Clic Recommendation	rivacy or damage your k 'Show details' to learn Status	1
Virus:DOS/EICAR Test File	Severe	Remove	<ul> <li>Suspended</li> </ul>	
Show details >>	Clean co	mputer Apply actio	ns Close	)



#### **Binary**

# Kanooty

## **Educating Your Users**

 Structural training
 Includes all employees and management
 E-mail monthly security updates
 Update virus signature database automatically

## Educating Your Users

SpyBot and Ad-Aware Help protect against spyware and adware Windows Defender is excellent too Firewalls Hardware (enterprise solution) Software (personal solution) Can be combined Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Monitors your network 24/7

## FUD

Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt

- Avoid scaring users into complying with security measures
- Sometimes used by unethical security testers
- Against the OSSTMM's Rules of Engagement
- Promote awareness rather than instilling fear
  - Users should be aware of potential threats
  - Build on users' knowledge





Liz Hafalia / The Ovoricle Computer viruses discovered in San Francisco City College servers have been stealing personal information for years.

View Larger Image

information and other data from perhaps tens > Tweet of thousands of 516 students, faculty and administrators at City f share College of San 11 Francisco have been stolen in what is being +1 called "an infestation" of computer viruses with origins in criminal networks in Russia, China and other countries, The Chronicle has learned.

Link Ch 3v

## Intruder Attacks on Networks and Computers

#### Attack

 Any attempt by an unauthorized person to access or use network resources

#### Network security

Security of computers and other devices in a network

#### Computer security

 Securing a standalone computer--not part of a network infrastructure

#### Computer crime

Fastest growing type of crime worldwide

## **Denial-of-Service Attacks**

Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
Prevents legitimate users from accessing network resources
Some forms do not involve computers, like feeding a paper loop through a fax machine
DoS attacks do not attempt to access information

Cripple the network

Make it vulnerable to other type of attacks

## Testing for DoS Vulnerabilities

Performing an attack yourself is not wise
You only need to prove that an attack could be carried out

### **Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks**

Attack on a host from multiple servers or workstations

- Network could be flooded with billions of requests
  - Loss of bandwidth
  - Degradation or loss of speed

Often participants are not aware they are part of the attack

They are remote-controlled "zombies"

## CloudFlare

#### Stops DDoS attacks for free

#### Without CloudFlare



#### With CloudFlare



## **Buffer Overflow Attacks**

Vulnerability in poorly written code
 Code does not check predefined size of input field

#### Goal

Fill overflow buffer with executable code

- OS executes this code
- Can elevate attacker's permission to Administrator or even Kernel

Programmers need special training to write secure code

Buffer overflow	Description
Solaris X Window Font Service	This buffer overflow affects Sun Microsystems Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, 8, and 9 and Solaris X Window Font Service systems. It allows attackers to run arbitrary code in memory. See VU#312313 (www.kb.cert.org/vuls) for more information.
Windows Server	Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-067 (www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/ MS08-067.mspx) discusses this buffer overflow vulnerability, which makes it possible for attackers to run arbitrary code placed in memory. This vulnerability allowed the Conficker worm to spread.
Remote Sendmail	This buffer overflow vulnerability affects all versions of Sendmail Pro and some versions of Sendmail Switch. The vulnerability allows attackers to gain root privileges on the attacked system. See VU#398025 for more details.
Windows Messenger Service	The Windows Messenger Service has a buffer overflow vulnerability that enables the attacker to run arbitrary code and gain privileges to the attacked system.
Windows Help and Support Center	Contains buffer overflow in code used to handle Human Communications Protocol (HCP). A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Help and Support Center function affects Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. The vulnerability allows attackers to create a URL that could run arbitrary code at the local computer security level when users enter that URL.
Sendmail	All systems running Sendmail versions before 8.12.10, including UNIX and Linux systems, are vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack that enables attackers to possibly elevate privileges to that of the root user.
Microsoft RPCSS Service	There are two buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the RPCSS Service, which handles DCOM messages. This service is enabled by default on many versions of Windows, but the vulnerability affects only Windows 2000 systems. For more information, see VU#483492 and VU#254236.
Internet Explorer	A total of five vulnerabilities affect Microsoft systems running Internet Explorer 5.01, 5.50, and 6.01. For more information, see Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-032.

## Ping of Death Attacks

Type of DoS attack

Not as common as during the late 1990s

#### How it works

- Attacker creates a large ICMP packet
   More than 65,535 bytes
- Large packet is fragmented at source network
- Destination network reassembles large packet
- Destination point cannot handle oversize packet and crashes
- Modern systems are protected from this (Link Ch 3n)

#### AUGUST 13, 2013

#### Microsoft Patch Tuesday: The Ping of Death returns, IPv6-style

This month's round of Microsoft patches address must-fix vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer and Microsoft Mail

By Joab Jackson | IDG News Service



## Ping Fragmentation Example

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## Fragrouter Demo

Kali Linux fragrouter –F 1 Another VM on same network, set default route to Kali's IP address All network traffic will be fragmented at layer 3 into 8-byte packets Often bypasses IDS



## **Session Hijacking**

Enables attacker to interrupt a TCP session
 Taking over another user's session

## Addressing Physical Security

 Protecting a network also requires physical security
 Inside attacks are more likely than attacks from outside the company

## **Insider Threats**

## CCSF's CTO



An interpretive image of the "no confidence" petition. Art by Jessica Kwan/The Guardsman

## San Francisco's NetAdmin

Conrad del Rosario Assistant District Attorney San Francisco District Attorney's Office White Collar Crimes Division

Case study on the Terry Childs case & more



image from BoingBoing

## **Cyber-Bullying Accusation**

#### Company Goes After One Of The World's Biggest Cyber Bully's Sam Bowne

Company goes after one of the world's biggest cyber bully's sam bowne professor at the city college of san francisco city college employee uses school networks to commit cyber bullying

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

PRLog (Press Release) - Jan 07, 2011 -COMPANY GOES AFTER ONE OF THE WORLD'S BIGGEST CYBER BULLY'S SAM BOWNE PROFESSOR AT THE CITY COLLEGE OF SAN FRANCISCO





## **Insider Threats**

¾ of the serious attacks on me were from industry insiders
 Anonymous attacked one of my servers,

but failed

Because an Anonymous insider warned me.

## Keyloggers

Used to capture keystrokes on a computer Hardware Software Software Behaves like Trojan programs Hardware Easy to install Goes between the keyboard and the CPU KeyKatcher and KeyGhost

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Figure 3-5 An e-mail message captured by KeyKatcher	

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#### Figure 3-6 The KeyGhost menu

## Keyloggers (continued)

Protection
 Software-based
 Antivirus
 Hardware-based
 Random visual tests
 Look for added hardware
 Superglue keyboard connectors in

## **Behind Locked Doors**

Lock up your servers
Physical access means they can hack in
Consider Ophcrack – booting to a CD-based OS will bypass almost any security

## Lockpicking

Average person can pick deadbolt locks in less than five minutes

After 30 min. of practice

Experienced hackers can pick deadbolt locks in under 30 seconds
Bump keys are even easier (Link Ch 3o)

## Card Reader Locks

Keep a log of who enters and leaves the room

Security cards can be used instead of keys for better security
 Image from link Ch 3p





#### **Binary**

# Kanooty